Considerations for Information Operations LLO

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  • Consider word choices carefully. Words are important - they have specific meanings and describe policy. For example, are counterinsurgents liberators or occupiers? Occupiers generate a "resistance," whereas liberators may be welcomed for a time. Soldiers and Marines can be influenced likewise. In a conflict among the people, terms like "battlefield" influence perceptions and confuse the critical nature of a synchronized approach. Refrain from referring to and considering the area of operations as a "battlefield" or it may continue to be one.
  • Publicize insurgent violence and use of terror to discredit the insurgency. Identify barbaric actions by extremists and the insurgents' disregard for civilian losses.
  • Admit mistakes (or actions perceived as mistakes) quickly. Explain these mistakes and actions as fully as possible - including mistakes committed by U.S. military forces. However, do not attempt to explain actions by the host-nation government. Instead encourage host-nation officials to handle such information themselves. They know the cultural implications of their actions better, and honesty should help to build legitimacy.
  • Highlight successes of the host-nation government and counterinsurgents promptly. Positive results speak loudly and resonate with people. Do not delay announcements while waiting for all results. Initiate communications immediately to let people know what counterinsurgents are doing and why. Delaying announcements creates "old news" and misses news cycles.
  • Respond quickly to insurgent propaganda. Delaying responses can let the insurgent story dominate several news cycles. That situation can lead to the insurgents' version of events becoming widespread and accepted. This consideration may require giving increased information assets and responsibilities to lower level leaders.
  • Shape the populace's expectations. People generally expect too much too soon. When the host-nation government or counterinsurgency force is slow to deliver, people become easily and perhaps unfairly disgruntled.
  • Give the populace some way to voice their opinions and grievances, even if that activity appears at first to cause friction. Such opportunities are important to both the formal political process and to informal, local issues (where government touches people directly). Develop a feedback mechanism from the populace to the local government to identify needs and align perceptions.
  • Keep Soldiers and Marines engaged with the populace. Presence patrols facilitate Soldiers and Marines mingling with the people. As the populace and counterinsurgents learn to know each other better, two-way communication develops, building trust and producing intelligence.
  • Conduct ongoing perception assessments. Identify leaders who influence the people at the local, regional, and national levels. Determine a population's relevant lines of loyalty as accurately as possible.
  • Treat detainees professionally and publicize their treatment. Arrange for host-nation leaders to visit and tour your detention facility. Consider allowing them to speak to detainees and eat the same food detainees receive. If news media or host-nation government representatives visit your detention facility, allow them as much access as prudent. Provide a guided tour and explain your procedures.
  • Consider encouraging host-nation leaders to provide a forum for initiating a dialog with the opposition. This does not equate to "negotiating with terrorists." It is an attempt to open the door to mutual understanding. There may be no common ground and the animosity may be such that nothing specifically or directly comes of the dialog. However, if counterinsurgents are talking with their adversaries, they are using a positive approach and may learn something useful. If the host nation is reluctant to communicate with insurgents, other counterinsurgents may have to initiate contact. Consider adopting a "We understand why you fight" attitude and stating this position to the insurgents.
  • Work to convince insurgent leaders that the time for resistance has ended and that other ways to accomplish what they desire exist.
  • Turn the insurgents' demands on the insurgents. Examine the disputed issues objectively then work wit host-nation leaders to resolve them where possible. Portray any success as a sign of responsiveness and improvement.
  • Portray the counterinsurgency forces as robust, persistent, and willing to help the population through the present difficulty.
  • Learn the insurgents' messages or narratives. Develop countermeasures and counternarratives to attack the insurgents' ideology. Understanding the local culture is required to do this. Host-nation personnel can play a key role.
  • Remember that the media's responsibility is to report the news. The standard against which the media should be judged is accuracy complemented by the provision of content and proper characterization of overall trends, not whether it portrays the actions of counterinsurgents, host-nation forces, and host-nation officials positively or negatively.
  • Conduct town meetings to assess and address areas where counterinsurgents can make things better.
  • When insurgents follow an ideology based on religious extremism, information operations should encourage, strengthen, and protect the society's moderating elements. Command themes need to portray a credible, publicly attractive vision that resonates with local culture. At the same time, commanders should avoid the appearance of interfering in the society's internal religious affairs.

Source: Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24

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