Host-Nation Security Forces LLO

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Host-Nation Security Forces LLO
Activities:	Develop initial concept for mission, structure, and organization; identify and recruit leaders and recruit members; establish training centers and infrastructure; develop organization infrastructure; provide for basing and training; employ HN security forces with COIN force advisors.
End State:	Effective and self-sufficient HN security forces established.

The Host-Nation Security Forces LLO is one of several LLOs in counterinsurgency operations. Most societal and government functions require a secure environment. Although U.S. and multinational forces can provide direct assistance to establish and maintain security, this situation is at best a provisional solution. Ultimately, the host nation must secure its own people. The U.S. military can help the host nation develop the forces required to establish and sustain stability within its borders.This task usually involves other government agencies and multinational partners. This assistance can include developing, equipping, training, and employing HN security forces. It may extend to operations in which multinational military units fight alongside the newly formed, expanded, or reformed HN forces.

There is also a framework for developing host-nation security forces, and an outline of resources for developing host-nation security forces as well.

Considerations for developing the host-nation security forces LLO

• Understand the security problem. The function, capabilities, and capacities required for host-nation security (military and police) forces should align with the theater strategy, host-nation culture, and the threat these forces face.
• Take a comprehensive approach, beginning with planning. Consult local representatives to determine local needs. Include host-nation government and military authorities as partners. Consult with multinational partners and intergovernmental organizations that may be involved. Share leadership with local authorities to achieve legitimacy in the eyes of the populace.
• Avoid mirror-imaging (trying to make host-nation forces look like the U.S. military). That solution fits few cultures or situations.
• Establish separate training academies for military and police forces. Staff them with multinational personnel. (Tap into the talents of as many nations as possible for this.) Maintaining public order, enforcing laws, and preventing and detecting crime requires a trained and capable host-nation police force. Likewise, an operational penal system providing adequate and human confinement is needed to support host-nation police and judicial processes.
• Establish mobile training teams.
• Train the host-nation cadre first. Focus on identifying leaders. Use trained leaders to establish new units, staff training academies, and staff mobile training teams (where appropriate).
• Create special-purpose forces based on threats facing the host nation.

• For police, consider special reaction teams, a counterespionage organization, port security, and public figure security.
• For the host-nation military, consider riverine operation forces, explosive ordinance disposal, and other specialized units.

• Put host-nation personnel in charge of as much as possible as soon as possible.
• Conduct operations with host-nation forces. Show that you respect their partnership. Once host-nation forces are ready to work with the counterinsurgency force, include them in planning. Encourage host-nation leaders to take ownership of plans and operations as they move toward self-sufficiency.
• Respect host-nation security force leaders in public and private. Show the populace that their security forces have earned counterinsurgents respect. However, do not tolerate abuses. Base respect on generally upright comportment by host-nation security forces.
• Provide advisors for host-nation units under development. Place liaison officers with trained host-nation units. Make sure all involved understand how an advisor differs from a liaison officer.
• Establish competent military and police administrative structures early. Provision and pay host-nation forces on time. Pay should come from the host-nation organization, not the counterinsurgency force.
• Encourage insurgents to change sides - welcome them in an "open-arms" policy. However, identify insurgents seeking to join the security forces under false pretext. Vetting repatriated insurgents is a task for the host-nation government in partnership with the country team.
• Encourage the host-nation to establish a repatriation or amnesty program to allow insurgents an alternative to the insurgency.
• There are important logistic considerations for this LLO.

There are also several indicators that can be used to help measure progress for this LLO in the quantitative knowledge portal.

Source: Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24