Pashtuns
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| Pashtuns [ Edit ] | |
|---|---|
| Religion(s): | Sunni Islam,Shia Islam |
| Language(s): | Pashtu,Dari,Urdu |
| Primary Location(s): | Afghanistan,Pakistan |
| Subgroup(s): | Sarbanri |
| Traditional Disputes: | |
| Traditional Alliances: | |
| Politically Supports: | |
The Pashtuns, also referred to as Pakhtuns or, especially in Pakistan, Pathans, are an ethnic group that primarily resides in a crescent-shaped region that runs south and east along the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pashtuns are also found in enclaves scattered across the north of the country and in the western interior. Approximately 42% of Afghanistan, and 15.42% of Pakistan is Pashtun.[ref 1][ref 2] Pashtuns are predominately Sunni from the Hanafi tradition. A small minority of Pashtuns are Shiites, principally clustered in the Kurram river valley in Kurram Agency of Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Virtually all members of the Turi tribe of the Karlanri Pashtuns in that valley are Shiites, as are some Bangash, Chamkanni, and Orakzai clans.[ref 3]
Contents |
Pashtun Tribes and Pashtun Identity
The Pashtun have often been referred to as the world's largest tribal society. Within Pashtun society, networks of tribes, sub-tribes, clans, and families are linked to each other through mutually understood bonds of kinship: "All Pashtuns know their current particular place on their people's intricate genealogical chart with its hundreds of 'tribes', 'sub-tribes', 'clans'…ect."[ref 4] For most Pashtuns, however, tribal affiliation is only one factor that informs personal identity and sociopolitical activity.
Though tribe is a significant factor in Pashtun society, tribes aren't necessarily political units that act collectively and are not the only source of Pashtun identity nor the only foundation of Pashtun social organization. Anthropologists often use the analytical unit qaum, from the Arabic word qama meaning those who rise together in war, referring to a group of people that has something in common and acts as a single group. A qaum could be identified as a tribe, ethnicity, geographical location, professional class, warlord’s name, or a village name.
The tribal system is also not as important in some areas as it is in others. For example, in the east of the country, Pashtun tribal systems continue to provide order and stability, and the tribal system has remained largely intact and functioning. In urban areas, the tribal system tens to carry less weight and does not contribute to societal ordering to the same degree. Essentially, where the central government's authority is weak (i.e. in peripheral rural areas) the Tribal system will tend to function better. For successive Afghan regimes, this meant that the state's authority only reached so far, and in large, rural swathes of the country, tribal structures predominated and functioned without government presence. The Taliban and previous governments have shown a tendency to allow functioning tribal groups to remain outside of government control.
The overarching tribal system is based on the belief that all Pashtuns are originally descended from a single patriarch, variously named Qays Abdur Rashid, Daru Nika, or Baba Khaled. As Pashtun legend has it, the founding father had many sons and grandsons, and from those progeny emerged the Pashtun tribes, and from their progeny emerged other tribes and clans, and so forth. This understanding of a common ancestor translates into a particular attitude of unity amongst the Pashtun.[ref 5] Because of the presumption of their shared kinship, traditional Pashtun society is strictly egalitarian: all Pashtun are regarded as equal to one another. Of course, one's socio-economic terms must be gained on an individual basis. Pashtuns, regardless of their lineage, must make their own way and gain their own status through deeds.[ref 6]
Pashtun tribes are divided into four large, overarching groups, named after the sons of Qays Abdur Rashid, the initial Pashtun patriarch: Sarban, Batan, Ghorghasht and Karran. In keeping with this tradition, Pashtun tribes are usually named after an ancestor and carry the suffix "khel" (kin) or "zai" (son) denoting the relationship.
Contemporarily, Afghan Pashtuns delineate between two large tribal groupings, the Durrani and the Ghilzai. The two groups have, for centuries, held a rivalry over control of the central apparatus of the Afghan state. The Durrani reside in southeast Afghanistan on the border with Pakistan's Baluchistan province, in what is now the provinces of Kandahar, Helmand, Uruzgan, Zabul, and Nimroz. The Ghilzai predominate in the eastern Afghanistan, in what are now Zabul, Paktika, Ghazni, and Paktya provinces, and across the Pakistani border into the Northwest Frontier Province.[ref 7][ref 8]
Within each of the large tribal confederations exist many smaller sub-tribes. These sub-tribes are further divided into clans called 'khel. A khel is constructed around several kin groups that are directly related to one another through patrilineage. In turn, each of the kin groups (known as pllarina or plaraney) in a khel are constructed around an extended family group of direct blood relatives. These groupings, depending on their size, traditionally live in close contact with one another in a village, a kalay, or a collection of villages, collectively using some of the buildings or infrastructure, such as the irrigation systems. These groups form the backbone of the larger tribe, and loyalties and identity are closely attached to these small, but intensely close knit, groups.[ref 9]
Some Pashtun tribes are localized to a certain degree, and identify with a particular "homeland." Tribes in eastern Afghanistan, on the mountainous border with Pakistan often have a connection with their heritage through their land. Land in these areas is customarily shared by the tribe (or sub-tribe), and there is no landlord-tenant arrangement. Other, larger tribes, such as the members of the Durrani and the Ghilzai are spread out and lack the identification of their heritage through their land, and tenancy is more common.[ref 10]
Aside from identification with tribe and kin group, Pashtuns have a deep sense of what it means to "be Pashtun." Especially in the more traditional and tribally-oriented Pashtun areas, to "be Pashtun" means to live within a very strict regimen of language, culture and law. To be a "true" Pashtun one must speak Pashto, practice Islam, be of patrilineal Pashtun descent, respect and practice Pashtun custom and values, and adhere to the codes of Pashtunwali.[ref 11] Pashtunwali, however, is a constrictive and rigid set of customary laws, which are difficult to reconcile with the demands of modern society, as Barfield suggests: "…[Pashtunwali] is a code that is practically impossible to fulfill in a class-structured society or in areas where governments prohibit such institutions as blood feuds and demand tax payment...It is therefore the people who inhabit the most marginal lands that are poor and beyond government control who see themselves as the only true Pashtuns. These include the Ghilzai border regions of eastern Afghanistan and the Karlani FATA [Federally Administered Tribal Areas] regions of the NWFP [Northwest Frontier Province] because only the can maintain the strict standards of autonomy demanded by the Pashtunwali'."[ref 12]
While tribe, kin, and the customs of Pashtunwali are important to Pashtun identity and social organization in Afghanistan, three decades of armed conflict and socio-political upheaval have corroded Pashtun tribal structures. Many of the bedrocks of traditional Pashtun society, including Pashtunwali and the jirga no longer fulfill their historically important role. During the years of conflict many Pashtun elders, traditionally authority figures, were eliminated or displaced by the communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) government, new power-brokers, or the Taliban. When faced with individuals who were more powerful by virtue of their superior armed force, finances, and external support, traditional sources of authority, such as the jirga were supplanted. The decades of war have also sent many Pashtuns, both elders and youth, abroad or into urban centers, where the bonds of tribal affiliation are weaker. Due to this, in many areas across southern Afghanistan, the Pashtun tribal structures are extremely fragile or simply non-existent; jirga decisions and elder's authority are ignored, egalitarian modes of reciprocity have been replaced by hierarchical patrimonialism, and "...might often trumps pashtunwali, and even Islamic law."[ref 13]
Moreover, tribal categories are not monolithic identity blocs. Tribe, like other forms of identity, is fluid and subject to change, and certainly does not represent the totality of an individual's social, political, and economic identity. As Thomas Ruttig states: "There are, in reality, no fixed places on the Pashtun genealogical tree and no eternal, unchanging tribal institutions. Much of what is told about them are myths, idealized versions of a golden past that probably never existed in a pure form and definitely not across the Pashtun areas in the same way."[ref 14]
Regardless of the declining importance of traditional tribal structures within some Pashtun areas, tribal identity continues to be an important source of political power and influential political, military, and economic personalities are often quick to claim to represent the interests of Pashtun tribes.[ref 15]
Pashtun Leadership and Political Organization
The emphasis on equality and proving oneself in Pashtun society makes gaining leadership positions within Pashtun tribes a difficult task, and one that is constantly under threat of change or reversal. Indeed, political power in Pashtun society is circumscribed by checks and balances within the tribal system that are in place to resist a particular leader's hegemony.[ref 16]
Leadership positions are not necessarily hereditary, and family standing is not a guarantor of leadership positions. As lineage is not enough to convince followers, a tribal leader must initially convince and then constantly reaffirm that he deserves his follower's loyalty. Therefore, patron-client relationships between a leaders and his followers are essential. Pashtun leaders must prove their abilities to procure and re-distribute resources, act in an honorable fashion and show superior personal traits, and provide security to their followers. The instability of Pashtun leadership is so pervasive that tribal leaders must continually prove their ability to provide for their group. Where a leader is unable to provide adequate levels of essential political goods to his followers, they may simply abandon him in favor of a stronger personality.[ref 17]
Another important aspect of successful leadership in Pashtun society is knowing how to balance tura (the sword) and aql (reason). Indeed, these two attributes are important parts of identity formation for all Pashtun.
tura: Courage, bravery, and ferocity are principal aspects of tura. This measure of Pashtun identity, and especially masculine identity, is concerned with the individual acts of courage and bravery performed by a single Pashtun, first for their personal honor and dignity, secondly for the autonomy and pride of their tribe or clan. While positive tura, that is, acts that are appreciated as singularly brave, reflect upon the individual and the rest of the tribe. However, an individual must prove themselves through tura: the tribe's tura does not attach itself to an individual. This is an inherently aggressive aspect of Pashtun identity, and goes some way in explaining the violence that often seems inherent in Pashtun society.
aql: Aql is the counter-point to tura. Instead of associating with aggression and violence, aql is concerned with patience, mediation, and compromise. Not simply restricted to one person, aql is designed to support and benefit the entire community, wether clan, tribe, or nation. Aql represents knowledge and grace, knowing when to call a truce or mediate in a conflict. As a counter-balance to tura, aql is closely identified with age and wisdom: where youth are expected to act brashly and aggressively, elders are meant to act with measured reason.
In terms of leadership, a traditional Pashtun leader needs to demonstrate both aql and tura: "An ambitious Pashtun wants to become khan, a person who has proved tura, who is sharp in thinking and just and prudent in his judgements, who is an acknowledged expert of pashtunwali, who exercises hospitality and who is ready to share his wealth with adherents, guests, and all et people under his protection."[ref 18]
Tribes have proved to be a useful instrument for leaders to mobilize political support, especially contemporarily. Since tribes are essentially large kin groups, political entrepreneurs have been able to form bonds between different tribes, sub-tribes, clans and sub-clans, to the point where a successful leader can bind together a large enough group to contest power on a national scale. However, independently-minded Pashtuns are notoriously difficult to retain in an alliance for a substantial amount of time: "Once a charismatic leader who masters the instrument of segmentary alliance looses influence or dies the divisive character of the segmentary tribal system will gain the upper hand. Tribal systems do not usually develop institutionalized political power which could tolerate fluctuations in the abilities of individual rulers." That is to say, without a strong, charismatic, and capable leader to maintain them, state-like institutions will wither underneath the pressure of multiple competing groups.[ref 19] Tribal leaders, or khans necessarily use patronage networks to build political support, and may or may not do so within the scope of the tribe. Since the beginning of the Soviet-Afghan war in the late 1970s, individual leaders who do not work from within tribal structures have increasingly been important players in the Pashtun political landscape. Rather than working through tribal institutions such as the jirga, these leaders gained and maintained power through their ability to provide security and distribute resources. Therefore, in some Pashtun areas, the power of the local strongman or "commander" holds more sway than does tribal institutions.[ref 20]
A paradox of historical Pashtun leadership is that often successful, large-scale national leaders become divorced from the tribal system altogether. When leaders have been able to develop their power to the level of state, they do so from a power base that has been tribally-based. However, as has been discussed above, tribal institutions are inadequate to maintain large-scale political groupings. Therefore, leaders who are able to develop states tend to also develop the apparatus of the state, at the expense of relying on tribal systems to maintain stability. In this sense, as state bureaucratic power increases, the impact, (and loyalty) of tribal systems on the ruler degrades. In this sense, it is clear that "tribes" themselves may not seek to attain state power, but individuals, political entrepreneurs, can utilize tribal systems as a way of gaining political power.[ref 21]
Land, and control over land is an important aspect of Pashtun identity and status. Ideally, land is privately owned in Pashtun society and is passed down patrilineally, and is divided between the father's sons after his death. Even though the land itself may be unproductive, the simple fact of ownership is crucial. In some Pashtun areas, ownership of land is necessary to prove one's undeniable "Pashtunness." Indeed, the importance of land, and defending one's land, is a significant part of the Pashtunwali, as well as a catalyst for internecine conflicts between first cousins. In more isolated and remote parts of Afghanistan and Pakistan one is not even considered a real Pashtun if they do not own their own land, and monetized systems of sharecropping and landlordship are considered disgraceful and dishonorable. The insistence on independently-owned land corresponds with the extreme focus on individuality and autonomy that characterizes traditional Pashtun society.[ref 22]
Pashtunwali
Pashtunwali is the traditional code that governs the behavior of individual Pashtun. Pashtunwali is not, however, simply a "rulebook" for respectable behavior. Living within the rules and constraints of Pashtunwali is the way in which belonging is communicated. Pashtuns differentiate themselves from other ethnic groups within Afghanistan and Pakistan through adherence to Pashtunwali, living by the rules set out in the code endows personal identity with a larger "Pashtun Nation." Pashtunwali also operates a way to judge behavior; to follow the code is to live perfectly in line with cultural expectations of what it is to "be Pasthun." Moreover, Pashtunwali contains the legal code that formally judges tribal behavior. In areas where the tribal structure has remained intact, Pashtunwali provides a common legal standard by which behavior can be judged to be legitimate or illegitimate. In this sense, Pashtunwali is an identifier of group belonging, a model for socially-acceptable behavior, a guideline to the Pashtun values-system, and a common structure for legal action and conflict-resolution.[ref 23]
Interestingly, Pashtunwali, while identified most commonly with the Pashtun ethnicity, is also practiced, to more or less degrees, by other ethnic groups in Afghanistan. After centuries of living alongside one another, cultural norms that were distinct to a single group at one time may now have been adopted by other groups who are facing the same conditions and pressures. Therefore, while Pashtunwali and its precepts cannot be said to be followed by every group in Afghanistan, many of its conditions and rules governing behavior are familiar to the larger -non-Pashtun Afghan society.[ref 24]
The principal pillars of this code are nang (honor, shame, and bravery); nanawati (mediation or protection); badal and taboorwali (retaliation and revenge); mailmastia, hospitality, and jirga (assembly of elders).[ref 25] [ref 26]
- Nang: The code of honor and shame, Nang is probably the most important Pashtunwali code, and dictates behavior in everyday life as well as in specific situations, such as warfare. In essence, nang is the honor that Pashtuns gain by living their lives in the correct manner. Nang is translated to an individual's close group, be it tribe or kin; the ability or inability of an individual to reflect nang properly is translated to the entire group, bringing honor or shame to all. A Pashtun who lives properly through nang is referred to as a nangialay. In comparison, to be called dishonorable or undignified (benanga) is a horrifying insult, and may require the insulted to take physical retaliation, to the point of killing the insulter.
Two crucial aspects of nang are sharm (shame) and namus (privacy, sanctity). Sharm can be used as a tool of instruction to the young, which relates the unacceptability of certain actions, or it can be used derogatorily, as a way of showing that certain behavior is bringing dishonor to an individual and their family. Namus is closely connected to the role of females in Pashtun society. Namus is inherently protective; it operates on the basis that women are weaker than men, and therefore need to be protected and sheltered at all times. This protection and shelter is immediate and material: the women in a family need to be protected physically, from potential enemies or unwanted suitors. If a female member of the family is not protected adequately, for example if she engages in unacceptable sexual behavior, then namus has been violated and the honor of the entire family is at stake and needs to be defended all the more. This is partially why women are kept from the public sphere as much as possible, as even gossip about a woman's alleged infidelity or dishonor can threaten the nang of the entire family. Namus is also a larger term used to mean privacy or sanctity, and is closely related to the inviolability of Pashtun land and territory. The concept herein it that if the sanctity of the family is compromised, than all aspects of Pashtun life are under threat, especially the autonomy of one's land. Indeed, violations of namus and attempts to protect it, are some of the chief causes of violent conflict in Pashtun society. According to Bernt Glatzer, some of the mobilization of mujahideen fighters during the Soviet occupation was spurned on by the perception that the common namus of Afghans was under threat from the Soviet authorities and the government in Kabul.[ref 27][ref 28][ref 29][ref 30]
- Badal: Badal is the Pashtunwali code for revenge and retaliation. Disputes in which one party is dishonored, killing of fellow family, clan, or tribe members, and violence against visitors to a Pashtun home all necessitate revenge. Often, this type of violence and counter-violence can continue for generations, as each cycle of violence instigates further revenge attacks. Moreover, there is no "statue of limitations" on revenge; some feuds and disputes continue extra-generationally, until the aggrieved party is satisfied. Revenge is required within Pashtunwali. It is extremely dishonorable not to exact revenge from one's enemies, and that dishonor is felt by the individual's entire kin or tribe. Violence is used to restore lost honor, either personally or on the part of the group. Often, these feuds are strongest between patrilineal first cousins (called tabur). Tabur are more likely to feud due to the fact that they are often competing over patrilineally-bestowed land, which is usually scarce. The scarcity of resources and the competition over them simply raises the stakes in feuds over honor or revenge killings, and may escalate the scope and numbers involved in the fighting. Badal is referred to as "the primary law," and is hugely important in maintaining or restoring nang.[ref 31][ref 32][ref 33][ref 34]
- Maslimastia: Malimastia (also referred to as Melmastia, and Melmasteya) is the Pashtun conception of hospitality. Hospitality for strangers, or those that are known to a Pashtun is a crucial aspect of Pashtunwali, and its strict observance is important to maintaining nang. A Pashtun is obligated to extend the highest degree of service to a guest in the village or household. No expense is to be wasted, as malimastia demands that a Pashtun expend the limits of their wealth and resources in providing their guest with comfort. By providing for his guest to the limits of his ability grants honor and prestige upon the host, as it proves to what degree his wealth and power can go. As a guest, one is obligated to accept whatever the host provides. Furthermore, the host, or host community, is obligated to provide security for the guest, both while they reside in the community as well as after they leave until they reach their next destination. For example, if a guest is robbed on the road leading out of a community where they have just spent the night as a guest, the community is obligated to take revenge on their robbers or risk dishonor. In many villages, there is a permanent guest house, or Hujra. Within the Hujra guests are offered rest, food, and entertainment.[ref 35][ref 36]
Like most aspects of Pasthunwali, malimastia has evolved and, while still adhered to, has changed in practice depending on the context on the ground. For example, malimastia has been used to shelter foreign Islamist militants in Pakistan's tribal areas, but in "...some of these areas...its had become as "stay as you pay system," allowing many in the tribal areas to enrich themselves while providing food and shelter to various foreign and domestic militants. Consequently, Pashtunwali...became increasingly flexible and adaptive and was used to legitimize the symbiotic relationship between foreign and domestic militants."[ref 37]
- Nanawatee: Nanawatee is another important aspect of Pashtunwali; the concept is similar to malimastia, in that it works on the premise that individuals must not be turned away from a person's home. In this case, it is part of the conflict resolution system that the Pashtun have developed. When an enemy comes to a Pashtun house to offer an agreement for peace and an end to a feud it is required that that person be let in and an agreement between the two groups is reached. Nanawatee is crucial to conflict resolution as it offers a way out of a damaging feud,as well as keeping the honor of the participants intact. In fact, nanawatee is crucial for Pashtuns to demonstrate aql (reason), an important factor when determining one's honor and prestige.[ref 38][ref 39]
Jirga
The jirga is a traditional Pashtun method of conflict resolution and decision making. The jirga emulates the egalitarian nature of traditional Pashtun society. There are several levels of jirga, but the general organization is similar across all levels. A jirga is convened on an ad-hoc basis, with the goal of resolving a intra or inter-tribal conflict or making a decision on a matter of particular importance to the tribe. The jirga is convened in a public area; the participants organize themselves in a circle, emphasizing the egalitarian nature of the gathering. There is no official coordinator of the jirga, and there is no hierarchy of speakers: any male is allowed to voice their questions or concerns to the assembly. The goal of the jirga is to come to a consensus on a particular issue that has been the cause of conflict within the tribe or between tribes. The jirga participants discuss and debate the issue at hand before coming to a consensus decision on an appropriate course of action to take. As Christine F. Ridout explains: "One a decision is made, it is absolutely binding on all members of the group including those who disagreed with it. The chief is given total authority to cary out the decision and those who disregard it are subject to severe punishment. Respect for the jirgah is deeply ingrained in all Afghans and very few would no abide by its decision. The jirgah thus acts as a mechanism for social and political control and is the only institutionalized device which resolves conflicts and makes decisions which pertain to the entire group."[ref 40][ref 41]
Since the war against the Soviet Union during the 1980s, the jirga has been augmented or in some cases replaced, by the shura (or shora). A shura has a similar goal as the jirga: to make decisions on important matters that have impact on the entire village, clan, or tribe. Rather than an ad-hoc meeting of elders and important community leaders however, the membership of the shura is more permanent, and their meetings often follow a set schedule. More than a body conceived to make only a single decision, the shura "...is more like a short-term advisory council of elders, landlords, khans and military commanders without clearly defined rules." Moreover, the shura, which is an Arabic, and not Pashto-derived word, has also come to be associated with militarism and military or insurgent command decisions and leadership.[ref 42][ref 43]
The jirga is also responsible for raising and directing the arbakai (also known as salwishti in Pakistan's FATA, and paltanai in Kandahar), the militia that deals with issues of law and order within Pashtun communities. Arbakai are unpaid, voluntary males from a particular tribe, or tribal sub-division who are chosen to carry out the directions of the jirga. The main responsibilities of the arbakai are to carry out the jirga's decisions, protect the boundaries and borders of the group of external threat, and maintain law and order within the community. Membership in the arbakai is regarded as an honor, and only those me who have proven themselves by living fully within Pasthunwali are considered eligible for service. Traditionally, the arbakai were able to operate because they had the loyalty, confidence, and trust from their community. In more recent times, with the near-collapse of the tribal system in many Pashtun areas, the arbakai institution has been lost or replaced with militias tied to local power-brokers rather than to local communities. The arbakai institution remains strong in some areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan, especially in the remote and isolated south-east of Afghanistan where tribal structures have not been as weakened as they have in other Pashtun areas.[ref 44]
References
- ↑ "Afghanistan." The World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency.
- ↑ "Pakistan." The World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency.
- ↑ Thomas H. Johnson and Chris M. Mason, "No Sign Until the Burst of Fire," International Security, vol. 32, no. 4 (Spring 2008).
- ↑ Ruttig, Thomas. "How Tribal are the Taliban?: Afghanistan's Largest Insurgent Movement between its Tribal Roots and Islamist Ideology." Afghanistan Analysts Network, Thematic Report No. 4, 2010: 6.
- ↑ Glatzer, Brent. "The Pashtun Tribal System." in Concept of Tribal Society. eds. G. Pfeffer D. K. Berhera, New Delhi: Concept Publishers, 2002, 267-269.
- ↑ Oliver, Roy. "Afghanistan: internal Politics and Socio-Economic Groupings." UNHRC Emergency and Security Services. WRITENET Paper No. 14, 2003
- ↑ Barfield, Thomas J. "Weapons of the not so Weak in Afghanistan: Pashtun Agrarian Structure and Tribal Organization for Times of War and Peace." Yale University, Agrarian Studies Colloquium Series, February 23, 2007.
- ↑ "East Afghanistan Tribal Map." Naval Post-Graduate School, Program for Culture and Conflict Studies.
- ↑ Wardak, Ali. "Jirga: a Traditional Mechanism of Conflict Resolution in Afghanistan." 7.
- ↑ Glatzer, Brent. "The Pashtun Tribal System." in Concept of Tribal Society. eds. G. Pffer & D.K. Behera. New Delhi: Concept Publichers, (2002): 271.
- ↑ Oberson, Jose. "Khans and Warlords: Political Alignment , Leadership, and the State in Pashtun Society." Phd Dissertation, University of Berne, Bern Switzerland (2002): 15.
- ↑ Barfield, Thomas J. "Weapons of the not so Weak in Afghanistan: Pashtun Agrarian Structure and Tribal Organization for Times of War and Peace." Yale University, Agrarian Colloquium Series: "Hinterlands, Frontiers, Cities, and States: Transactions and Identities." February 23, 2007, 11.
- ↑ Ruttig, Thomas. "How Tribal are the Taliban?: Afghanistan's Largest Insurgent Movement between its Tribal Roots and Islamist Ideology." Afghanistan Analysts Network. AAN Thematic Report No. 4, 2010, 8-9.
- ↑ Ruttig, Thomas. "How Tribal are the Taliban?: Afghanistan's Largest Insurgent Movement between its Tribal Roots and Islamist Ideology." Afghanistan Analysts Network. AAN Thematic Report N0. 4, 2010, 4-7
- ↑ Forsberg, Carl. "Politics and Power in Kandahar." Institute for the Study of War, Afghanistan Report No. 5, April 2010. 11-12.
- ↑ Oliver, Roy. "Afghanistan: internal Politics and Socio-Economic Groupings." UNHRC Emergency and Security Services. WRITENET Paper No. 14, 2003
- ↑ Glatzer, Bernt. "The Pashtun Tribal System." in Concept of Tribal Society. eds. G. Pfeffer & D.K. Behera, New Delhi: Concept Publishers, 2002, 271-273.
- ↑ Glatzer, Bernt. "Being Pashtun-Being Muslim: Concepts of Person and War in Afghanistan." in Essays on South Asian Society: Culture and Politics II. ed. B. Glatzer, Berlin: Das Arabische Buch, 1998, 87-92.
- ↑ Glatzer, Bernt. "The Pashtun Tribal System." in Concept of Tribal Society. eds. G. Pfeffer D.K. Behera, New Delhi: Concept Publishers, 2002, 270-273
- ↑ My Cousin's Enemy is My Friend: A Study of Pashtun "Tribes" in Afghanistan." Afghanistan Research Reachback Center, United States Army. Fort Leavenworth, KS 2009: 13.
- ↑ Glatzer, Bernt. "The Pashtun Tribal System." in Concept of Tribal Society. eds. G. Pfeffer & D.K. Behera, New Delhi: Concept Publishers, 2002, 275
- ↑ Titus, Paul. "Honor the Baluch, Buy the Pashtun: Stereotypes, Social Organization, and History in West Pakistan." Modern Asian Studies 32, 3 (1998): 667-668
- ↑ Oberson, Jose. "Khans and Warlords: Political Alignment, Leadership, and the State in Pashtun Society." Phd Dissertation, Institute for Ethnography, University of Berne. Bern, Switzerland (2002): 36-37
- ↑ Wardak, Ali. Jirga: A Traditional Method of Conflict Resolution in Afghanistan."
- ↑ Ludwig W. Adamec, Historical Dictionary of Afghanistan, 2nd edition (The Scarecrow Press: London, 1997).
- ↑ Oberson, Jose. "Khans and Warlords: Political Alignment, Leadership, and the State in Pashtun Society." PhD Dissertation, Institute for Ethnography, University of Berne. Bern, Switzerland (2002): 37-42.
- ↑ Glatzer, Bernt. "Being Pashtun-Being Muslim: Concepts of Person and War in Afghanistan." in Essays on South Asian Society: Culture and Politics II. ed. B. Glatzer. Berlin: Das Arabische Buch, 1998 87-91
- ↑ Jose Oberson. "Khans and Warlords: Political Alignment, Leadership, and the State in Pashtun Society." PhD Dissertation, Institute for Ethnography, University of Berne. Bern Switzerland (2002): 37-40
- ↑ Hawkins, Jonathan. "The Pastun Code: Pashtunwali." Australian Defense Force Journal: Journal of the Australian Profession of Arms. 180 (2009: 16-18.
- ↑ Miakhel, Shahmahmood. "The Importance of Tribal Structures and Pakhtunwali in Afghanistan: Their Role in Security and Governance."
- ↑ Oberson, Jose. "Khans and Warlords: Political Alignment, Leadership, and the State in Pashtun Society." PhD Dissertation, University of Berne Institute for Ethnography. Bern, Switzerland (2002): 40-41.
- ↑ Miakhe, Shahmahmood. "The Importance of Tribal Structures and Pakhtunwali in Afghanistan: Their Role in Security and Governance." 5-6.
- ↑ Hawkins, Jonathan. "The Pashtun Cultural Code: Pashtunwali." Australian Defense Froce Journal. 180 (2009): 18-19/
- ↑ "My Cousin's Enemy is my Friend: A Study of Pashtun Tribes in Afghanistan." Afghanistan Research Reachback Center White Paper, United States Army. Fort Leavenworth, KS, September 2009: 9-10
- ↑ Miakhel, Shahmahmood. "The Importance of Tribal Structures and Pakhtunwali in Afghanistan: Their Role in Security and Governance." 6-7.
- ↑ Oberson, Jose. "Khans and Warlords: Political Alignment, Leadership, and the State in Pashtun Society." PhD Dissertation, University of Berne Institute for Ethnography. Bern Switzerland, (2002): 41
- ↑ Jones, Seth G. & Christine Fair. "Counterinsurgency in Pakistan." RAND Corporation, 2010, 58.
- ↑ Oberson, Jose. "Khans and Warlords: Political Alignment, Leadership, and the State in Pashtun Society." PhD dissertation, University of Berne, Institute for Ethnology. Bern, Switzerland (2002): 41-42.
- ↑ Wardak, Ali. "Jirga:A Traditional Mechanism of Conflict Resolution in Afghanistan." 11-12.
- ↑ Ridout, Christine F. "Authority Patterns and the Afghan Coup of 1973." Middle East Journal 29, 2 (1975): 169-170
- ↑ Oberson, Jose. "Khans and Warlords: Political Alignment, Leadership, and the State in Pashtun Society." PhD Dissertation, University of Berne, Institute for Ethnography. Bern, Switzerland (2002): 42.
- ↑ Wardak, Ali. "Jirga: A Traditional Mechanism for Conflict Resolution in Afghanistan." 5.
- ↑ Glatzer, Brent. "The Pashtun Tribal System." in Concept of Tribal Society. eds G. Pfeffer and D. K. Behera. New Delhi: Concept Publishers, 2002: 272.
- ↑ Tariq, Mohammed Osman. "Tribal Security System (Arbakai) in Southeast Afghanistan." Crisis States Research Center, Occasional Paper No. 7, December 2008:1-6

