Complex Operations Wiki - Recent changes [en]

Second generation peacekeeping

2010-09-04T00:23:53Z

References:

New page

A component of [[Peacekeeping Operation | Peacekeeping]] and [[Stability Operations]] and various stages of SSTR operations.

Often referred to as “multi-dimensional” peacekeeping operations, second generation PKOs “involve the implementation of complex multidimensional peace agreements. In addition to traditional military functions, the peacekeepers are often engaged in various police and civilian tasks, the goal of which is a long-term settlement of the underlying conflict.” <ref group="ref">Doyle, Michael W., War Making and Peace Making: The United Nations’ Post-Cold War Record, reprinted in Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001, pg 532. </ref>

These peacekeeping operations are heavily influenced by [[An Agenda for Peace]], and include complicated tasks such as election monitoring, police training, assisting in the management and security of refugee populations, overseeing disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs, etc. The combination of these activities are carried out in an effort to “keep the peace” in a post-conflict scenario.

In some instances, the UN has gone as far as propping up new governments in the wake of conflict through “transitional authorities”. These transitional authorities are government-type structures established by the UN for the purpose of quickly (re-) establishing governments, police/military training, establishment of justice systems and civil society. Transitional authorities have been implemented following or alongside peacekeeping operations in Timor Leste and Cambodia.

'''Characteristics of second generation peacekeeping operations:'''
* complex, “nation-building” activities
* focus on governance and capacity building
* Transitional authorities
* cantonment and demobilization of armed forces
* DDR programs
* work with refugee and internally displaced persons populations
* restoration of order and civil society
* capacity-building (nation-building) initiatives
* interagency work with NGOs, [[community-based organizations | CBOs]], and other international organizations

== References ==
<references group="ref" />
Sources:

War Making and Peace Making: The United Nations’ Post-Cold War Record

“An Agenda for Peace,” 31 January 1992.

First generation peacekeeping

2010-09-04T00:20:42Z

New page

A component of [[Peacekeeping Operation | Peacekeeping]] and [[Stability Operations]] and various stages of SSTR operations.

Unarmed and lightly-armed troops deployed to monitor ceasefires or borders during low-intensity conflicts make up the majority of “first generation” PKOs. The strategy of these operations are deterrence via the presence of a neutral party; non-intervention is a key component. First generation peacekeeping does not take place unless a cease fire or peace treaty is signed before the deployment of troops. Essentially, blue helmets are used to monitor and deter conflict, but they are not charged with any enforcement responsibilities and will not deploy to a region where outbursts of violence have occurred recently or are likely to occur in the future. Finally, these missions usually require the consent of involved states – often they are requested by member-states.

Criticism for this type of operation usually focuses on the long-term nature of conflicts. Because first generation peacekeeping adheres to the principle of neutrality and monitors, but does not intervene, conflict tends to persist rather than culminate in a resolution. Supporters of these PKOs point to the long-term peace in regions where first generation peacekeeping operations have been deployed. Examples include the disputed Kashmir region, Cyprus, and the Western Sahara.

'''Characteristics of first-generation peacekeeping operations:'''
* neutrality
* pre-existing peace agreements/ceasefires
* monitoring (of truces, ceasefires, peace treaties, state borders)
* interpositional forces
* long-term operations
* consent of state parties
* nonuse of force

Current and Former first generation missions:

== References ==
<references group="ref" />
Source: Doyle, Michael: War Making and Peace Making: The United Nations’ Post-Cold War Record

Peacekeeping generations

2010-09-04T00:18:48Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 00:18, 4 September 2010
Line 21:		Line 21:
	== References ==		== References ==
	<references group="ref" />		<references group="ref" />
-	Source: ~~[[Source~~:~~:Sphere Handbook]]~~	+	Source: War Making and Peace Making: The United Nations’ Post-Cold War Record

Peacekeeping Operation

2010-09-04T00:16:16Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 00:16, 4 September 2010
(One intermediate revision not shown)
Line 1:		Line 1:
	A component related to [[Stability Operations]] and various stages of SSTR operations.		A component related to [[Stability Operations]] and various stages of SSTR operations.
		+


Line 24:		Line 25:
	Regardless of how one defines the nebulous term, peacekeeping is a means of preventing the spread of violent conflict and war. Modern PKOs are often referred to as “multidimensional” operations because they include methods and missions that fall outside the traditional scope of warfare: humanitarian assistance, policing, DDR campaigns, and various aspects of nation-building. Modern PKOs must work with government officials, [[community-based organizations]], as well as numerous international and local actors. Additionally, troops deployed in peacekeeping operations must work with military and civilian agencies from other troop contributing countries.		Regardless of how one defines the nebulous term, peacekeeping is a means of preventing the spread of violent conflict and war. Modern PKOs are often referred to as “multidimensional” operations because they include methods and missions that fall outside the traditional scope of warfare: humanitarian assistance, policing, DDR campaigns, and various aspects of nation-building. Modern PKOs must work with government officials, [[community-based organizations]], as well as numerous international and local actors. Additionally, troops deployed in peacekeeping operations must work with military and civilian agencies from other troop contributing countries.

-	Because the definition of peacekeeping is complicated and refers to various types of stability operations, some experts refer to four [[peacekeeping generations]] "generations" or classifications of PKOs. These specifically refer to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations.	+	Because the definition of peacekeeping is complicated and refers to various types of stability operations, some experts refer to four [[peacekeeping generations \| peacekeeping "generations"]] or classifications of PKOs. These specifically refer to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations.
		+

	== Origins of Peacekeeping ==		== Origins of Peacekeeping ==
Line 54:		Line 56:

	Countries in which Chapter VII missions have been deployed include: Somalia, the Former Yugoslavia, Cambodia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, among others.		Countries in which Chapter VII missions have been deployed include: Somalia, the Former Yugoslavia, Cambodia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, among others.
		+


	== References ==		== References ==
	<references group="ref" />		<references group="ref" />

Peacekeeping generations

2010-09-04T00:14:25Z

New page

A component of [[Peacekeeping Operation | Peacekeeping]] and [[Stability Operations]] and various stages of SSTR operations.

== Overview ==

United Nations peacekeeping operations are often categorized in “generations”. These generations do not reflect chronological developments of PKOs, but rather categorize the type of mandate approved for particular missions. For example, the 1960-1964 Congo mission (ONUC) is a third generation PKO, but many of the missions that proceeded thirty years later, in the post-cold Cold War era, are described as second generation peacekeeping operations (e.g. El Salvador, Mozambique, and Eastern Slavonia). <ref group="ref">Doyle, Michael W., War Making and Peace Making: The United Nations’ Post-Cold War Record, reprinted in Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001, pgs 530-532, 555. </ref>

== Generations ==

It is important to remember that generations of peacekeeping operations are not universally agreed upon. Many speak in terms of “ecologies” of peacekeeping, while others only differentiate between Chapter VI and Chapter VII mandates. Nevertheless, understanding peacekeeping operations as generations helps organize a framework for considering the various types of PKOs the UN has overseen since its inception, as well as gauge the effectiveness of these endeavors.

UN Peacekeeping Operations fall into four broad categories:
* [[First generation peacekeeping]] – neutral and observational
* [[Second generation peacekeeping]] – complex multidimensional operations
* [[Third generation peacekeeping]] – humanitarian and multidimensional operations
* [[Fourth generation peacekeeping]] – peace enforcement operations

== References ==
<references group="ref" />
Source: [[Source::Sphere Handbook]]

Peacekeeping Operation

2010-09-04T00:05:20Z

Definition:

← Older revision		Revision as of 00:05, 4 September 2010
Line 23:		Line 23:

	Regardless of how one defines the nebulous term, peacekeeping is a means of preventing the spread of violent conflict and war. Modern PKOs are often referred to as “multidimensional” operations because they include methods and missions that fall outside the traditional scope of warfare: humanitarian assistance, policing, DDR campaigns, and various aspects of nation-building. Modern PKOs must work with government officials, [[community-based organizations]], as well as numerous international and local actors. Additionally, troops deployed in peacekeeping operations must work with military and civilian agencies from other troop contributing countries.		Regardless of how one defines the nebulous term, peacekeeping is a means of preventing the spread of violent conflict and war. Modern PKOs are often referred to as “multidimensional” operations because they include methods and missions that fall outside the traditional scope of warfare: humanitarian assistance, policing, DDR campaigns, and various aspects of nation-building. Modern PKOs must work with government officials, [[community-based organizations]], as well as numerous international and local actors. Additionally, troops deployed in peacekeeping operations must work with military and civilian agencies from other troop contributing countries.
		+
		+	Because the definition of peacekeeping is complicated and refers to various types of stability operations, some experts refer to four [[peacekeeping generations]] "generations" or classifications of PKOs. These specifically refer to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations.

	== Origins of Peacekeeping ==		== Origins of Peacekeeping ==

Control of non-communicative diseases

2010-09-03T23:55:08Z

Created page with 'A component of Health services and Essential Tasks and Best Practices in SSTR operations, outlined in Chapter 5 of the Sphere Handbook == Overview == In the wake of…'

New page

A component of [[Health services]] and [[Essential Tasks and Best Practices]] in SSTR operations, outlined in Chapter 5 of the [[Sphere Handbook]]

== Overview ==
In the wake of a natural disaster, non-communicable diseases are often the result of injury or physical violence. Increased morbidity is often related to HIV/AIDS, gender-based violence, poor obstetric care, and poor access to primary health care. More difficult to quantify, are psycho-social problems arising after a disaster. Evidence suggests psycho-social disorders can increase the likelihood and incidence of chronic disease.

== Minimum Standards ==

There are four [[Sphere Handbook Minimum Standards for Operations | minimum standards]] that aid workers should consider when mitigating the spread of communicable diseases.

* Injury – Standard 1
* Reproductive health – Standard 2
* Mental and social aspects of health – Standard 3
* Chronic diseases – Standard 4

'''Injury – Standard 1'''

Injuries are especially common in the wake of a disaster or conflict, and affected populations need access to suitable health facilities where appropriate treatment can be obtained.

Local populations should be encouraged to develop capacity for responding to injuries after a natural disaster that might lead to an increase in mortality rates. Typically, 85-90% of persons rescued after a disaster are rescued during the first 72 hours. Local facilities should triage patient volumes to determine how best to serve and manage the population. Basic first aid should be provided to injured patients. Additionally, surgery and other life-saving procedures should be provided whenever possible.

'''Reproductive health – Standard 2'''

Complications emerge in the wake of a natural disaster that affect pregnant women disproportionately. Precautions should be taken to prevent an increase in death and mortality rates. Gender-based violence is a common problem, especially in natural disasters that destabilize communities and result in displaced persons. Refugee and internally displaced persons (IDPs) camps increase the risk for gender-based violence. The layout and security of settlements should be designed in a way to deter the likelihood of marginalizing female populations. Codes of conduct should be enforced.

Emergency obstetric care is also a major problem during a complex operation. As much as 15% of any population is likely to require obstetric care, and this statistic increases after a destabilizing disaster.

The Sphere Handbook recommends that affected populations have access to a Minimum Initial Service Package (MISP). The MISP responds to direct reproductive health needs and includes supplies, as well as education materials and information about preventing neonatal and maternal mortality. The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) has designed a MISP kit specific for humanitarian disasters.

'''Mental and social aspects of health – Standard 3'''

People need access to mental health services after a disaster or conflict. Social services can reduce the risk of disability, social problems, and mental health diseases that stem from trauma and stress resulting from a natural disaster.

Community-based psychological programs and interventions are increasingly common in first responder communities. Collaborating with local leaders and health workers is highly recommended. Culturally sensitive practices should be observed whenever possible as this provides members of an affected population to with a sense of normalcy. Burials often aid distressed family members, but can also cause increased stress. Care should be given to handling sensitive issues such as managing bodily remains. Information after a disaster should be disseminated in a straightforward, uncomplicated manner in order to reduce psycho-social stress.

'''Chronic diseases – Standard 4'''

Managing chronic disease in a disaster response program is especially difficult and little existing literature addresses the problem of providing treatment and medications that are life-saving to patients suffering from chronic illness. This can include persons dependent on dialysis, insulin and other essential medicines.

== References ==
<references group="ref" />
Source: [[Source::Sphere Handbook]]

Control of communicable diseases

2010-09-03T23:54:21Z

Overview:

← Older revision		Revision as of 23:54, 3 September 2010
Line 5:		Line 5:
	== Overview ==		== Overview ==

-	In the wake of natural disasters, 60%-90% of deaths are related to or caused by communicable diseases. These include diarrhea, malaria, respiratory diseases, measles, and cholera. Children, pregnant women and [[Vulnerable Groups \| vulnerable populations]] are especially susceptible to communicable diseases and need to be prioritized in any health management plan.	+	In the wake of natural disasters, 60%-90% of deaths are related to or caused by communicable diseases. These include diarrhea, malaria, respiratory diseases, measles, and cholera. Children, pregnant women and [[Vulnerable Groups \| vulnerable populations]] are especially susceptible to communicable diseases and need to be prioritized in any health management plan. Epidemics are most commonly related to flooding, storms (hurricane, typhoons, tsunamis), and earthquakes – or any situation where water and sanitation is disrupted. It is often useful to conduct early [[Core Standards for Stability Operations - Initial Assessment \| initial assessments]] to determine what populations are at greatest risk for contracting and/or spreading communicable diseases.
-		+
-	Epidemics are most commonly related to flooding, storms (hurricane, typhoons, tsunamis), and earthquakes – or any situation where water and sanitation is disrupted.	+
-		+

	== Minimum Standards ==		== Minimum Standards ==

Health services

2010-09-03T23:52:30Z

About:

← Older revision		Revision as of 23:52, 3 September 2010
Line 6:		Line 6:


-	In the aftermath of a natural disaster, a “health intervention” sometimes takes place where multiple state (government agencies, political leaders) and non-state actors (NGOs, regional organs, UN agencies) cooperate to deliver emergency relief. It is important to incorporate disaster-affected communities into the planning and implementation phases of such a health intervention. This can be done initially by conducting an [[Core Standards for Stability Operations – Initial Assessment \| initial assessment]]. After gauging the magnitude of damages to the health system and analyzing the existing resources and capabilities, deployed personnel should work with host governments, [[Community-based organizations \| CBOs]] and other affected parties to implement a comprehensive health recovery program.	+	In the aftermath of a natural disaster, a “health intervention” sometimes takes place where multiple state (government agencies, political leaders) and non-state actors (NGOs, regional organs, UN agencies) cooperate to deliver emergency relief. It is important to incorporate disaster-affected communities into the planning and implementation phases of such a health intervention. This can be done initially by conducting an [[Core Standards for Stability Operations - Initial Assessment \| initial assessment]]. After gauging the magnitude of damages to the health system and analyzing the existing resources and capabilities, deployed personnel should work with host governments, [[Community-based organizations \| CBOs]] and other affected parties to implement a comprehensive health recovery program.

	== Minimum Standards ==		== Minimum Standards ==

Control of communicable diseases

2010-09-03T23:48:29Z

New page

A component of [[Health services]] and [[Essential Tasks and Best Practices]] in SSTR operations, outlined in Chapter 5 of the [[Sphere Handbook]]

== Overview ==

In the wake of natural disasters, 60%-90% of deaths are related to or caused by communicable diseases. These include diarrhea, malaria, respiratory diseases, measles, and cholera. Children, pregnant women and [[Vulnerable Groups | vulnerable populations]] are especially susceptible to communicable diseases and need to be prioritized in any health management plan.

Epidemics are most commonly related to flooding, storms (hurricane, typhoons, tsunamis), and earthquakes – or any situation where water and sanitation is disrupted.

== Minimum Standards ==

There are six [[Sphere Handbook Minimum Standards for Operations | minimum standards]] that aid workers should consider when mitigating the spread of communicable diseases.

* Prevention – Standard 1
* Measles prevention – Standard 2
* Diagnosis and case management – Standard 3
* Outbreak preparedness – Standard 4
* Outbreak detection, investigation and response – Standard 5
* HIV/AIDS – Standard 6

'''Prevention – Standard 1'''

Preventing an epidemic is the best way to protect a population in the wake of a natural disaster from increased mortality rates associated with communicable diseases. Information and education is paramount to preventing the spread of disease. Consider the important primary sectors: [[Water Supply | water and sanitation]]; [[Nutrition | food security and nutrition]]; and [[Shelter and Settlement | access to shelter]].

'''Measles prevention – Standard 2'''

Measles has an extremely high potential for outbreak, and it causes significant mortality rates, especially among children. Vaccination against the disease should be a high priority. Those who are most vulnerable are between the ages of 6 months and 15 years – this is the target population for vaccinations.

'''Diagnosis and case management – Standard 3'''

Individuals have the right to proper medical treatment and this should include access to a physician or clinical expert who can properly diagnose illness. Additionally, once the prognosis of a patient has been established s/he should have the privilege of standardized case management health protocols. Proper diagnosis and case management is important because it is a right protected in the [[Humanitarian Charter]], and also because it helps prevent the spread of disease.

Important recommendations:
* Public health messages should deliver up-to-date information about the location and access of clinics and health facilities
* In the case of an epidemic, it is especially important to establish protocols for managing malaria, tuberculosis, cholera, measles and other diseases associated with high mortality rates
* Integrate management programs that monitor, and respond to, childhood illness
* Consult WHO standards for establishing or reviewing drug protocols

'''Outbreak preparedness – Standard 4'''

A comprehensive health system will prepare for and respond rapidly to an outbreak. Preparation is crucial to quickly managing a potential pandemic. Control plans should exist and first responders should immediately implement them at the first signs of outbreak.

Important recommendations:
* Reserve stocks of supplies and drugs should be kept on-site whenever possible
* Sampling materials should also be readily available and testing facilities should be identified quickly, then accessed by the affected population
* Isolation sites and areas for treating infectious patients should be identified prior to an outbreak

'''Outbreak detection, investigation and response – Standard 5'''

To curb the number of deaths caused by disease, an outbreak should be quickly detected, investigated, and responded to by local health workers supplemented with external actors and aid organizations.

Important recommendations:
* Outbreak should be described according to time, place and person
* Health information systems should include early warning systems to detect pandemics
* Community health workers (CHWs) should be trained to manage outbreaks of disease
* In the event CHWs do not have the training necessary to respond to an epidemic, minimum health standards should be disseminated to medical professionals, as well as the local community
* Control measures should relate specifically to the disease causing the outbreak
* Interrupting transmission should remain a high priority
* [[Vector Control]] techniques should be implemented immediately
* Health information systems should track the number of cases, as well as mortality rates and the number of patients treated

'''HIV/AIDS – Standard 6'''

Protection against the spread of HIV/AIDS is an important component of any community health program. Involvement of the community, especially people living with HIV/AIDS will assist in limiting the spread of infection. If possible, increased access to anti-retroviral drugs should attempted, but this is often difficult.

The Sphere Handbook recommends an “essential package of services” that should be made available during/after a disaster.<ref group="ref">“The Sphere Project,” Sphere Handbook, p. 283-284; 2004: http://sphereproject.org. </ref>

This includes:
* free male condoms
* education and promotion of effective condom use
* safe blood supply
* syndromic case management of sexually transmitted infections
* prevention of sexual violence
* basic health care for people living with HIV/AIDS
* preventive efforts to minimize transmission in emergency health environments

== References ==
<references group="ref" />
Source: [[Source::Sphere Handbook]]

<references group="ref" />
Source: World Health Organization, "WHO, UNICEF tackle critical lack of "child size" medicines: http://www.who.int/childmedicines/media/backgrounder/BG2/en/index.html

Health systems and infrastructure

2010-09-03T23:39:53Z

Minimum Standards:

New page

A component of [[Health services]] and [[Essential Tasks and Best Practices]] in SSTR operations, outlined in Chapter 5 of the [[Sphere Handbook]]

== Overview ==

Early responders in disaster response scenarios must consider the immediate needs of a health system (during the disaster) and the long-term sustainability of health services infrastructure after the initial response phase. According to the Sphere Handbook, “Throughout all phases of the response, a health systems approach to the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of services will contribute to ensuring that the most important needs are met, that coverage is appropriate, that access is optimized, and that quality is promoted.” <ref group="ref">“The Sphere Project,” Sphere Handbook, p. 258; 2004: http://sphereproject.org. </ref>

== Minimum Standards ==

There are six [[Sphere Handbook Minimum Standards for Operations | minimum standards]] that aid workers should consider when assisting to restore or rebuild healthcare infrastructure.

* Prioritizing health services – Standard 1
* Supporting national and local health systems – Standard 2
* Coordination – Standard 3
* Primary health care – Standard 4
* Clinical services – Standard 5
* Health information systems – Standard 6

'''Prioritizing health services – Standard 1'''

Understanding how to prioritize a response to a health system is important to its long-term sustainability. A common mantra is to strive for “providing the greatest health benefit to the greatest number of people.” The ultimate goal, of course, is to provide universal health access to an affected population.

Crude mortality rate and Under-5 mortality rate. The Crude mortality rate (CMR) is a quantifiable measure that health experts can use to monitor morbidity after a natural disaster. Aid workers should cross-reference the CMR after a disaster with the baseline for the country prior to the effects of conflict or crisis. If the CMR is unknown, agencies should attempt to establish a rate below 1 death per 10,000 per day (1.0/10,000/day). UNICEF is an excellent resource for referencing best practices and also finding country CMRs prior to a disaster.” <ref group="ref">“The Sphere Project,” Sphere Handbook, p. 260; 2004: http://sphereproject.org. </ref>

'''Supporting national and local health systems – Standard 2'''

All health interventions should establish local capacity and build infrastructure that supports the indigenous community of healthcare providers. Wherever possible, integrate new programs into existing structures with the assistance of local health workers.

It is important to understand who is the acting lead health authority in a country after a disaster or conflict. Typically this is the Ministry/Department of Health (MOH). However, if the MOH does not have the capacity to respond to a disaster, a UN agency often assumes this responsibility. Therefore, it is necessary for early responders to work closely with the World Health Organization, UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as well as leading NGOs assisting the health system.

Consider the national standards and guidelines; relying on them whenever possible will include more local health workers who have the expertise necessary to triage during an emergency. These individuals are also invaluable to (re-)establishing a national infrastructure because they are familiar with local medicine customs and care that is suitable for the affected population.

Important recommendations:
* Utilize local hospitals before field hospitals if possible
* Ministry/Department of Health should lead responses unless it lacks the ability to do so
* Incorporate local health workers and agencies in the design, implementation, and monitoring phases of rebuilding health infrastructure
* Incorporate national standards

'''Coordination – Standard 3'''

To maximize the impact of restoring a health system, coordination should exist across local, national, and international agencies and governments. The more stakeholders that contribute to an operation, the more likely the population will benefit. Local government policies and workers should always be consulted, and international responders should assist by contributing aspects of a program that support any existing capacity.

'''Primary health care – Standard 4'''

Primary health care privileges should inform the foundational aspects of rebuilding a health system – that is, that individuals have access to holistic healthcare that prevents rather than responds to disease, infection, and general well-being.

Primary health care relies on information, education, and access. Patients should have access to information about their own well-being. Barriers to education about personal health and hygiene should be minimized. Finally, access to regular clinical care should not be obstructed based on gender, ethnicity, or social and economic factors.

Important recommendations:
* Scientifically sound and culturally appropriate standards and practices should be implemented whenever possible
* Culturally appropriate technology should support health infrastructure
* Mobile clinics can meet the needs of a population in the wake of disaster and also fit into the long-term plans for national health infrastructure
* National policies should support local standards
* Disseminating policies to regional and local levels of a government will help standardize best practices

'''Clinical services – Standard 5'''

Clinical services vary widely around the world. It is important after a disaster to return the health standards of a community to its normative, pre-conflict level. Clinical standards refer to everything from training and pharmaceutical management to the handling of the deceased.

Staffing needs are among the most important aspects of clinical services to consider. Adequate levels of staffing might be difficult to establish early in a disaster response effort. According to the Sphere Handbook, “The number, skills and gender/ethnic balance of staff at each health facility…should be appropriate to meet the needs of the population.” Additionally, it is important to monitor health facilities during the rebuilding of infrastructure process to ensure health codes are met, appropriate personnel are employed and the population has access to facilities.

A general guide for appropriate staffing levels includes:
* one health worker per 500-1,000 persons; one skilled birth attendant per 2,000 persons
* one peripheral (sometimes mobile) health facility per 10,000 persons; should be staffed by 2-5 trained health workers; untrained staff can be used to administer dressings and small bandages, as well as manage clerical, administrative, and/or sanitation responsibilities required in the clinic
* one central health facility per 50,000 persons; should include minimum of one physician, and one skilled health worker per 50 consultations per day; it is ideal if such a health care facility has access to a referral hospital and/or a physician trained in surgery

The management and disposal of dead bodies is especially difficult after a disaster that causes mass casualties. This situation is exacerbated when health and social services infrastructure lack the capacity to provide funerary services and meet appropriate protocol for burial. According to the Sphere Handbook, “The mass management of human remains is often based on the false belief that they represent an epidemic hazard if not buried or burned immediately. In fact, the health hazard presented by dead bodies is usually negligible. In only a few special cases do human remains pose health risks and require specific precautions, e.g. deaths resulting from cholera or haemorrhagic fevers. Families should have the opportunity to conduct culturally appropriate funerals and burials.” <ref group="ref">“The Sphere Project,” Sphere Handbook, p. 269; 2004: http://sphereproject.org. </ref>

Important recommendations:
*A generally acceptable standard for staffing will ensure clinicians do not see more than 50 patients per day
* Review government drug lists in the wake of a disaster with the Ministry/Department of Health to assess the appropriateness of the lists
* Standardize protocols for treatment and administering/prescription of pharmaceuticals
* Heed patients’ rights after a disaster, even when this is often difficult; informed consent must always be sought to the extent possible

'''Health information systems – Standard 6'''

In a health system, data matters. Experts and responders need access to information, and it is important that health information systems, to the extent possible, monitor crude mortality rate (CMR), incidence rates of disease, the health facility utilization rate, and the number of patients seen per clinician per day.

== References ==
<references group="ref" />
Source: [[Source::Sphere Handbook]]

Nangarhar Province

2010-09-03T20:40:32Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 20:40, 3 September 2010
Line 27:		Line 27:
	'''*2002''': Suspected insurgent attacks in Nangarhar died down during the winter months, the onset of spring witnessed a spate of new bombings and attacks in the Province. In early April, the Afghan defense minister, [[Mohammad Qasim Fahim]] was the target of a bomb attack in central Jalalabad; the minister escaped unharmed, but the bomb killed at least four civilians and injured around 18. Fahim, one of the leading members of the [[Panjshiri]]-dominated transitional government, had many enemies, so it was unknown whether or not the attack was the fault of remnant Taliban forces.<ref group="ref">"Bombers in Attack on Afghan Minister." ''The Daily Telegraph'', 9 April, 2002.</ref> Several weeks later, another bomb was discovered and disarmed at the Jalalabad courthouse.<ref group="ref">"Afghan Officers Discover Bomb in Court House in Eastern Afghanistan." ''Afghan Islamic Press'', 30 April, 2002.</ref> In early May, the Jalalabad airport, which was used to ferry coalition forces and military supplies into the Province was attacked with up to four rockets, in the first such attack on Jalalabad since the previous December.<ref group="ref">"Airport Used by US, UK Forces in Eastern Afghanistan under rocket Attack." ''Afghan Islamic Press'', 9 May, 2002.</ref> In response to rising insecurity in the province and the suspected involvement of Taliban and foreign fighters, US forces launched an offensive against suspected insurgent hideouts on the Nangarhar border with Pakistan in early June.<ref group="ref">"US Forces Launch New Operation in Eastern Afghan Province." ''Afghan Islamic Press'', 2 June, 2002.</ref> In early July, in one of the most severe attacks on the Afghan Transitional government, gunmen opened fire on the vehicle of Haji Abdul Qadir, a powerful Nangarhar politician who was serving as a vice President in the Transitional Government and Minister of Public Works, while he approached his offices in [[Kabul Province\|Kabul]] killing the minister. In response security was ramped up in Nangarhar due to fears of increased violence in the aftermath of the assassination. Although the government immediately blamed the attack on Taliban and Al Qaeda operatives, others suggested that the minister's personal enemies among other political factions and criminal groups could be behind the attack.<ref group="ref">"Tight Security in Eastern Afghan Province after Assassination of its Governor." ''Afghan Islamic Press'', 2 July, 2002.</ref><ref group="ref">"Afghan Spokesman Says Miniter's Murder was 'Terrorist Act'." ''Xinhua News'', 7 July, 2002.</ref><ref group="ref">Filkins, Dexter. "Afghan Killing May be Linked to Drug Trade." ''The New York Times'', 8 July, 2002.</ref> In August, a massive explosion at a construction office in Jalalabad rocked the city, and killed between 11 and 25 people. There was some confusion as to the cause of the explosion, with some officials declaring that it was a Taliban attack aimed at the neighboring Doronta hydroelectric dam, while others suggested that it was an accidental explosion of materials stored in the constriction facility.<ref group="ref">"Blast Kills 25: Afghan Military Calls it Terrorism." ''The Gazette'', 10 August, 2002.</ref> Later in the month another rocket attack targeted the Jalalabad airport and the dam.<ref group="ref">"Eastern Afghan Airport comes under Rocket Attack." ''Afghan Islamic Press'', 28 August, 2002.</ref> Small-scale attacks continued throughout the fall, underlying the continued strength of the remaining Taliban in the Province.		'''*2002''': Suspected insurgent attacks in Nangarhar died down during the winter months, the onset of spring witnessed a spate of new bombings and attacks in the Province. In early April, the Afghan defense minister, [[Mohammad Qasim Fahim]] was the target of a bomb attack in central Jalalabad; the minister escaped unharmed, but the bomb killed at least four civilians and injured around 18. Fahim, one of the leading members of the [[Panjshiri]]-dominated transitional government, had many enemies, so it was unknown whether or not the attack was the fault of remnant Taliban forces.<ref group="ref">"Bombers in Attack on Afghan Minister." ''The Daily Telegraph'', 9 April, 2002.</ref> Several weeks later, another bomb was discovered and disarmed at the Jalalabad courthouse.<ref group="ref">"Afghan Officers Discover Bomb in Court House in Eastern Afghanistan." ''Afghan Islamic Press'', 30 April, 2002.</ref> In early May, the Jalalabad airport, which was used to ferry coalition forces and military supplies into the Province was attacked with up to four rockets, in the first such attack on Jalalabad since the previous December.<ref group="ref">"Airport Used by US, UK Forces in Eastern Afghanistan under rocket Attack." ''Afghan Islamic Press'', 9 May, 2002.</ref> In response to rising insecurity in the province and the suspected involvement of Taliban and foreign fighters, US forces launched an offensive against suspected insurgent hideouts on the Nangarhar border with Pakistan in early June.<ref group="ref">"US Forces Launch New Operation in Eastern Afghan Province." ''Afghan Islamic Press'', 2 June, 2002.</ref> In early July, in one of the most severe attacks on the Afghan Transitional government, gunmen opened fire on the vehicle of Haji Abdul Qadir, a powerful Nangarhar politician who was serving as a vice President in the Transitional Government and Minister of Public Works, while he approached his offices in [[Kabul Province\|Kabul]] killing the minister. In response security was ramped up in Nangarhar due to fears of increased violence in the aftermath of the assassination. Although the government immediately blamed the attack on Taliban and Al Qaeda operatives, others suggested that the minister's personal enemies among other political factions and criminal groups could be behind the attack.<ref group="ref">"Tight Security in Eastern Afghan Province after Assassination of its Governor." ''Afghan Islamic Press'', 2 July, 2002.</ref><ref group="ref">"Afghan Spokesman Says Miniter's Murder was 'Terrorist Act'." ''Xinhua News'', 7 July, 2002.</ref><ref group="ref">Filkins, Dexter. "Afghan Killing May be Linked to Drug Trade." ''The New York Times'', 8 July, 2002.</ref> In August, a massive explosion at a construction office in Jalalabad rocked the city, and killed between 11 and 25 people. There was some confusion as to the cause of the explosion, with some officials declaring that it was a Taliban attack aimed at the neighboring Doronta hydroelectric dam, while others suggested that it was an accidental explosion of materials stored in the constriction facility.<ref group="ref">"Blast Kills 25: Afghan Military Calls it Terrorism." ''The Gazette'', 10 August, 2002.</ref> Later in the month another rocket attack targeted the Jalalabad airport and the dam.<ref group="ref">"Eastern Afghan Airport comes under Rocket Attack." ''Afghan Islamic Press'', 28 August, 2002.</ref> Small-scale attacks continued throughout the fall, underlying the continued strength of the remaining Taliban in the Province.

-	'''*2003''': In February 2003 a US patrol was ambushed in Nangarhar, resulting in extended clashes between US and Afghan forces and suspected militants.<ref group="ref">"US Soldiers Come Under Attack in Eastern and Central Afghanistan." ''Hindokosh News Agency'', 24 February, 2003.</ref> In mid-March a car full of foreign journalists was bombed in [[Chaparhar District]] to the south of Jalalabad. The attack resulted in no casualties.<ref group="ref">"Bomb Explodes near Foreign Journalist's Cars in Afghan Nangarhar Province." ''Afghan Islamic Press'', 14 March, 2003.</ref> Days later, the house of a government official was targeted in a bomb attack in the center of Jalalabad.<ref group="ref">"Bomb Explosion Damages House in Eastern Afghanistan." ''Afghan Islamic Press'', 18 March, 2003.</ref> In April, a roadside bomb attacked a patrol of Afghan soldiers in [[Charparhar District]], killing three troops and wounding at least six others.<ref group="ref">"Three Afghan Troops Killed in Mine Explosion in Eastern Afghanistan." ''Afghan Islamic Press'', 23 April, 2003.</ref>	+	'''*2003''': In February 2003 a US patrol was ambushed in Nangarhar, resulting in extended clashes between US and Afghan forces and suspected militants.<ref group="ref">"US Soldiers Come Under Attack in Eastern and Central Afghanistan." ''Hindokosh News Agency'', 24 February, 2003.</ref> In mid-March a car full of foreign journalists was bombed in [[Chaparhar District]] to the south of Jalalabad. The attack resulted in no casualties.<ref group="ref">"Bomb Explodes near Foreign Journalist's Cars in Afghan Nangarhar Province." ''Afghan Islamic Press'', 14 March, 2003.</ref> Days later, the house of a government official was targeted in a bomb attack in the center of Jalalabad.<ref group="ref">"Bomb Explosion Damages House in Eastern Afghanistan." ''Afghan Islamic Press'', 18 March, 2003.</ref> In April, a roadside bomb attacked a patrol of Afghan soldiers in [[Charparhar District]], killing three troops and wounding at least six others.<ref group="ref">"Three Afghan Troops Killed in Mine Explosion in Eastern Afghanistan." ''Afghan Islamic Press'', 23 April, 2003.</ref> In May the Jalalabad airport was again targeted with a rocket attack by suspected militants.<ref group="ref">"Afghan Eastern Airport comes under Missile Attack." ''Afghan Islamic Press'', 13 May, 2003.</ref> In response to rising insecurity in Nangarhar US and Afghan forces launched another offensive involving hundreds of troops in [[Goshta District]], in an attempt to stem the flow of forces across the border from neighboring Pakistan.<ref group="ref">"Afghan, Coalition Forces Launch 'Massive' Operation in Afghan East." ''Afghan Islamic Press'' 21 June, 2003.</ref> Shortly after the beginning of the operation another rocket attack targeted the UNICEF office in Jalalabad, causing no casualties but causing damage to the building. Days later, a Taliban-affiliated insurgent group claimed responsibility for the rocket attacks on the city.<ref group="ref">"UNICEF Office comes under Attack in Eastern Afghan Town." ''Hindokosh News Agency'', 30 June, 2003.</ref><ref group="ref">'Taleban Attack Claims Responsibility for Missile Attacks in Afghan East." ''Afghan Islamic Press'', 6 July, 2003.</ref> Less than a month later two individuals were captured transporting explosives and bomb making equipment in Jalalabad.<ref group="ref">"Afghan Security Forces Arrest two Persons Carrying Bombs in Eastern City." ''Afghan Islamic Press'', 27 July, 2003.</ref> Days later another man was arrested in possession of landmines and grenades, security officials claimed that the individual was intending to attack the main hospital in Jalalabad.<ref group="ref">"Police from Afghan Border Province Foil Possible Terrorist Attack on Hospital." ''Bakhtar News Agency'', 31 July, 2003.</ref> In early September the Judicial department and the Indian Consulate were attacked with grenades in central Jalalabad. A bystander was wounded and buildings were slightly damaged in the attacks.<ref group="ref">"Civilian Injured in Grenade Attack in Eastern Afghan City." ''Afghan Islamic Press'', 2 September, 2003.</ref> Several days later a girl's school in northern [[Dara-i-Nur]] district was set ablaze, officials blamed insurgents linked to Gulboddin Hekmatryr for the attack, one of the first examples of a common intimidation tactic used by militants in other Afghan provinces.<ref group="ref">"Forces Loyal to Former Afghan Premier set Girl's School on Fire." ''Hindokosh News Agency'', 29 September, 2003.</ref> An important military base came under attack by a substantial insurgent force using heavy weapons in mid-Ocotber in the southern [[Khogyani District]], inflicting casualties on a unspecified number of Afghan government troops.<ref group="ref">"Taleban Suspected as Key Afghan Military Base comes under Heavy Attack." ''Afghan Islamic Press'', 18 October, 2003.</ref> Days later a rocket attack targeted the district center of [[Charparhar District]].<ref group="ref">"Afghan Eastern Province Area comes under Attack, no Casualties Reported." ''Radio Afghanistan'', 23 October, 2003.</ref>
	==References==		==References==
	<references group="ref"/>		<references group="ref"/>

Health services

2010-09-03T20:18:17Z

About:

New page

A component of [[Essential Tasks and Best Practices]] in SSTR Operations and outlined in Chapter 5 of the [[Sphere Handbook]].

== About ==

Healthcare services break down in the aftermath of a humanitarian crisis. In order to prioritize the restoration of health services, practitioners should have an understanding of the extant health care services prior to the disaster, the needs and risks related to the disaster, and the available resources. Because health services are interrelated with manifold aspects of a complex operation, they should be considered in conjunction with the other [[Sphere Handbook Minimum Standards for Operations | minimum standards]] outlined in the Sphere Handbook.

In the aftermath of a natural disaster, a “health intervention” sometimes takes place where multiple state (government agencies, political leaders) and non-state actors (NGOs, regional organs, UN agencies) cooperate to deliver emergency relief. It is important to incorporate disaster-affected communities into the planning and implementation phases of such a health intervention. This can be done initially by conducting an [[Core Standards for Stability Operations – Initial Assessment | initial assessment]]. After gauging the magnitude of damages to the health system and analyzing the existing resources and capabilities, deployed personnel should work with host governments, [[Community-based organizations | CBOs]] and other affected parties to implement a comprehensive health recovery program.

== Minimum Standards ==

According to the Sphere Handbook, the major health services components, or the minimum standards, that concern workers in the field are:
* [[Health systems and infrastructure]]
* [[Control of communicable diseases]]
* [[Control of non-communicative diseases]]

== References ==
<references group="ref" />
Source: [[Source::Sphere Handbook]]

Marwat

2010-09-03T19:45:58Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 19:45, 3 September 2010
Line 35:		Line 35:
	==Politics, Conflicts, and Alliances==		==Politics, Conflicts, and Alliances==
	===Important figures===		===Important figures===
-	Anwar Kamal is a politician in the Pakistam Muslim League (N) and is described as the leader of the Marwat tribe.<ref>"[http://www.financialexpress.com/news/story/188527/ Honour among them]." ''The Financial Express''. 2 Jan. 2007. Accessed 4 Aug. 2010. "The jirga had been convened to settle a blood-money claim against the Marwat tribe, which Mr Kamal leads..."</ref><ref>Honour among them; Pushtunwali." ''The Economist''. 23 Dec. 2006.</ref>	+	Anwar Kamal is a politician in the Pakistam Muslim League (N) and is described as the leader of the Marwat tribe.<ref>"[http://www.financialexpress.com/news/story/188527/ Honour among them]." ''The Financial Express''. 2 Jan. 2007. Accessed 4 Aug. 2010. "The jirga had been convened to settle a blood-money claim against the Marwat tribe, which Mr Kamal leads..."</ref><ref name=economist>Honour among them; Pushtunwali." ''The Economist''. 23 Dec. 2006.</ref>

	===Bhittani===		===Bhittani===
-	According to the Naval Postgraduate School, the [[Bhittani]] and Marwats are engaged in a "long-standing feud".<ref>"[http://www.nps.edu/programs/ccs/Docs/Pakistan/Tribes/Bhittani.pdf TRIBE: BHITTANI]." Program for Culture and Conflict Studies at the Naval Postgraduate School. Accessed 3 August 2010.</ref> The Marwats experienced some trouble from a gangleader called Arsala Khan, a Bhittani, whose Arsala group was responsible for the kidnapping and killing of a number of Marwats~~. In~~ August 2004 the Marwats were sufficiently provoked to block the Indus Highway in protest against the authorities' lack of response.<ref>"[http://www.dawn.com/2004/08/04/local31.htm Tribe ends Indus Highway blockade]." ''Dawn''. 4 Aug. 2004. Accessed 4 Aug. 2010.</ref> Per the collective responsibility clause of the Frontier Crimes Regulation, a number of women and children said to be related to Arsala Khan were kept in prison by Pakistani authorities, though in February 2005 the Peshawar High Court struck down a number of those detentions.<ref>"[http://www.dawn.com/2006/03/16/local29.htm 16 women, children in detention under FCR]." ''Dawn''. 16 March 2006. Accessed 4 Aug. 2010.</ref> In June 2007, Marwat elders had formed a committee to develop a plan with the aim of stemming the kidnappings, while also accusing the Taliban of aiding the kidnappers.<ref>Marwat, Ghulam, Mursalin. "[http://www.dawn.com/2007/06/15/nat9.htm Jirga formed to check kidnappings]." ''Dawn''. 15 June 2007. Accessed 4 Aug. 2010.</ref> Arsala Khan was finally killed in December 2007.<ref>"[http://www.dawn.com/2006/02/21/nat21.htm Jirga for tribal reconciliation]." ''Dawn''. 21 Feb. 2006. Accessed 4 Aug. 2010.</ref><ref>"[http://www.dawn.com/2007/12/21/local40.htm Body of outlaw found]." ''Dawn''. 21 Dec. 2007. Accessed 4 Aug. 2010.</ref>	+	According to the Naval Postgraduate School, the [[Bhittani]] and Marwats are engaged in a "long-standing feud".<ref>"[http://www.nps.edu/programs/ccs/Docs/Pakistan/Tribes/Bhittani.pdf TRIBE: BHITTANI]." Program for Culture and Conflict Studies at the Naval Postgraduate School. Accessed 3 August 2010.</ref> In April 2004, two Marwat girls were kidnapped by Bhittani tribesmen, spurring a 4,000-strong force of armed Marwat tribesmen with artillery to march into battle. Commanded by the tribe's chief, Anwar Kamal, the contingent actually killed the abducted girls during their destruction of a Bhittani village, with the death toll eventually reaching 80. The Marwat tribe was later forced to pay $60,000 at a jirga in response to blood-money claims.<ref name=economist/>
		+
		+	The Marwats also experienced some trouble from a gangleader called Arsala Khan, a Bhittani, whose Arsala group was responsible for the kidnapping and killing of a number of Marwats; in August 2004 the Marwats were sufficiently provoked to block the Indus Highway in protest against the authorities' lack of response.<ref>"[http://www.dawn.com/2004/08/04/local31.htm Tribe ends Indus Highway blockade]." ''Dawn''. 4 Aug. 2004. Accessed 4 Aug. 2010.</ref> Per the collective responsibility clause of the Frontier Crimes Regulation, a number of women and children said to be related to Arsala Khan were kept in prison by Pakistani authorities, though in February 2005 the Peshawar High Court struck down a number of those detentions.<ref>"[http://www.dawn.com/2006/03/16/local29.htm 16 women, children in detention under FCR]." ''Dawn''. 16 March 2006. Accessed 4 Aug. 2010.</ref> In June 2007, Marwat elders had formed a committee to develop a plan with the aim of stemming the kidnappings, while also accusing the Taliban of aiding the kidnappers.<ref>Marwat, Ghulam, Mursalin. "[http://www.dawn.com/2007/06/15/nat9.htm Jirga formed to check kidnappings]." ''Dawn''. 15 June 2007. Accessed 4 Aug. 2010.</ref> Arsala Khan was finally killed in December 2007.<ref>"[http://www.dawn.com/2006/02/21/nat21.htm Jirga for tribal reconciliation]." ''Dawn''. 21 Feb. 2006. Accessed 4 Aug. 2010.</ref><ref>"[http://www.dawn.com/2007/12/21/local40.htm Body of outlaw found]." ''Dawn''. 21 Dec. 2007. Accessed 4 Aug. 2010.</ref>

	==References==		==References==

Nangarhar Province

2010-09-03T19:41:04Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 19:41, 3 September 2010
Line 27:		Line 27:
	'''*2002''': Suspected insurgent attacks in Nangarhar died down during the winter months, the onset of spring witnessed a spate of new bombings and attacks in the Province. In early April, the Afghan defense minister, [[Mohammad Qasim Fahim]] was the target of a bomb attack in central Jalalabad; the minister escaped unharmed, but the bomb killed at least four civilians and injured around 18. Fahim, one of the leading members of the [[Panjshiri]]-dominated transitional government, had many enemies, so it was unknown whether or not the attack was the fault of remnant Taliban forces.<ref group="ref">"Bombers in Attack on Afghan Minister." ''The Daily Telegraph'', 9 April, 2002.</ref> Several weeks later, another bomb was discovered and disarmed at the Jalalabad courthouse.<ref group="ref">"Afghan Officers Discover Bomb in Court House in Eastern Afghanistan." ''Afghan Islamic Press'', 30 April, 2002.</ref> In early May, the Jalalabad airport, which was used to ferry coalition forces and military supplies into the Province was attacked with up to four rockets, in the first such attack on Jalalabad since the previous December.<ref group="ref">"Airport Used by US, UK Forces in Eastern Afghanistan under rocket Attack." ''Afghan Islamic Press'', 9 May, 2002.</ref> In response to rising insecurity in the province and the suspected involvement of Taliban and foreign fighters, US forces launched an offensive against suspected insurgent hideouts on the Nangarhar border with Pakistan in early June.<ref group="ref">"US Forces Launch New Operation in Eastern Afghan Province." ''Afghan Islamic Press'', 2 June, 2002.</ref> In early July, in one of the most severe attacks on the Afghan Transitional government, gunmen opened fire on the vehicle of Haji Abdul Qadir, a powerful Nangarhar politician who was serving as a vice President in the Transitional Government and Minister of Public Works, while he approached his offices in [[Kabul Province\|Kabul]] killing the minister. In response security was ramped up in Nangarhar due to fears of increased violence in the aftermath of the assassination. Although the government immediately blamed the attack on Taliban and Al Qaeda operatives, others suggested that the minister's personal enemies among other political factions and criminal groups could be behind the attack.<ref group="ref">"Tight Security in Eastern Afghan Province after Assassination of its Governor." ''Afghan Islamic Press'', 2 July, 2002.</ref><ref group="ref">"Afghan Spokesman Says Miniter's Murder was 'Terrorist Act'." ''Xinhua News'', 7 July, 2002.</ref><ref group="ref">Filkins, Dexter. "Afghan Killing May be Linked to Drug Trade." ''The New York Times'', 8 July, 2002.</ref> In August, a massive explosion at a construction office in Jalalabad rocked the city, and killed between 11 and 25 people. There was some confusion as to the cause of the explosion, with some officials declaring that it was a Taliban attack aimed at the neighboring Doronta hydroelectric dam, while others suggested that it was an accidental explosion of materials stored in the constriction facility.<ref group="ref">"Blast Kills 25: Afghan Military Calls it Terrorism." ''The Gazette'', 10 August, 2002.</ref> Later in the month another rocket attack targeted the Jalalabad airport and the dam.<ref group="ref">"Eastern Afghan Airport comes under Rocket Attack." ''Afghan Islamic Press'', 28 August, 2002.</ref> Small-scale attacks continued throughout the fall, underlying the continued strength of the remaining Taliban in the Province.		'''*2002''': Suspected insurgent attacks in Nangarhar died down during the winter months, the onset of spring witnessed a spate of new bombings and attacks in the Province. In early April, the Afghan defense minister, [[Mohammad Qasim Fahim]] was the target of a bomb attack in central Jalalabad; the minister escaped unharmed, but the bomb killed at least four civilians and injured around 18. Fahim, one of the leading members of the [[Panjshiri]]-dominated transitional government, had many enemies, so it was unknown whether or not the attack was the fault of remnant Taliban forces.<ref group="ref">"Bombers in Attack on Afghan Minister." ''The Daily Telegraph'', 9 April, 2002.</ref> Several weeks later, another bomb was discovered and disarmed at the Jalalabad courthouse.<ref group="ref">"Afghan Officers Discover Bomb in Court House in Eastern Afghanistan." ''Afghan Islamic Press'', 30 April, 2002.</ref> In early May, the Jalalabad airport, which was used to ferry coalition forces and military supplies into the Province was attacked with up to four rockets, in the first such attack on Jalalabad since the previous December.<ref group="ref">"Airport Used by US, UK Forces in Eastern Afghanistan under rocket Attack." ''Afghan Islamic Press'', 9 May, 2002.</ref> In response to rising insecurity in the province and the suspected involvement of Taliban and foreign fighters, US forces launched an offensive against suspected insurgent hideouts on the Nangarhar border with Pakistan in early June.<ref group="ref">"US Forces Launch New Operation in Eastern Afghan Province." ''Afghan Islamic Press'', 2 June, 2002.</ref> In early July, in one of the most severe attacks on the Afghan Transitional government, gunmen opened fire on the vehicle of Haji Abdul Qadir, a powerful Nangarhar politician who was serving as a vice President in the Transitional Government and Minister of Public Works, while he approached his offices in [[Kabul Province\|Kabul]] killing the minister. In response security was ramped up in Nangarhar due to fears of increased violence in the aftermath of the assassination. Although the government immediately blamed the attack on Taliban and Al Qaeda operatives, others suggested that the minister's personal enemies among other political factions and criminal groups could be behind the attack.<ref group="ref">"Tight Security in Eastern Afghan Province after Assassination of its Governor." ''Afghan Islamic Press'', 2 July, 2002.</ref><ref group="ref">"Afghan Spokesman Says Miniter's Murder was 'Terrorist Act'." ''Xinhua News'', 7 July, 2002.</ref><ref group="ref">Filkins, Dexter. "Afghan Killing May be Linked to Drug Trade." ''The New York Times'', 8 July, 2002.</ref> In August, a massive explosion at a construction office in Jalalabad rocked the city, and killed between 11 and 25 people. There was some confusion as to the cause of the explosion, with some officials declaring that it was a Taliban attack aimed at the neighboring Doronta hydroelectric dam, while others suggested that it was an accidental explosion of materials stored in the constriction facility.<ref group="ref">"Blast Kills 25: Afghan Military Calls it Terrorism." ''The Gazette'', 10 August, 2002.</ref> Later in the month another rocket attack targeted the Jalalabad airport and the dam.<ref group="ref">"Eastern Afghan Airport comes under Rocket Attack." ''Afghan Islamic Press'', 28 August, 2002.</ref> Small-scale attacks continued throughout the fall, underlying the continued strength of the remaining Taliban in the Province.

-	'''*2003''': In February 2003 a US patrol was ambushed in Nangarhar, resulting in extended clashes between US and Afghan forces and suspected militants.<ref group="ref">"US Soldiers Come Under Attack in Eastern and Central Afghanistan." ''Hindokosh News Agency'', 24 February, 2003.</ref>	+	'''*2003''': In February 2003 a US patrol was ambushed in Nangarhar, resulting in extended clashes between US and Afghan forces and suspected militants.<ref group="ref">"US Soldiers Come Under Attack in Eastern and Central Afghanistan." ''Hindokosh News Agency'', 24 February, 2003.</ref> In mid-March a car full of foreign journalists was bombed in [[Chaparhar District]] to the south of Jalalabad. The attack resulted in no casualties.<ref group="ref">"Bomb Explodes near Foreign Journalist's Cars in Afghan Nangarhar Province." ''Afghan Islamic Press'', 14 March, 2003.</ref> Days later, the house of a government official was targeted in a bomb attack in the center of Jalalabad.<ref group="ref">"Bomb Explosion Damages House in Eastern Afghanistan." ''Afghan Islamic Press'', 18 March, 2003.</ref> In April, a roadside bomb attacked a patrol of Afghan soldiers in [[Charparhar District]], killing three troops and wounding at least six others.<ref group="ref">"Three Afghan Troops Killed in Mine Explosion in Eastern Afghanistan." ''Afghan Islamic Press'', 23 April, 2003.</ref>
	==References==		==References==
	<references group="ref"/>		<references group="ref"/>

Marwat

2010-09-03T19:24:31Z

add ref

← Older revision		Revision as of 19:24, 3 September 2010
Line 35:		Line 35:
	==Politics, Conflicts, and Alliances==		==Politics, Conflicts, and Alliances==
	===Important figures===		===Important figures===
-	Anwar Kamal is a politician in the Pakistam Muslim League (N) and is described as the leader of the Marwat tribe.<ref>"[http://www.financialexpress.com/news/story/188527/ Honour among them]." ''The Financial Express''. 2 Jan. 2007. Accessed 4 Aug. 2010. "The jirga had been convened to settle a blood-money claim against the Marwat tribe, which Mr Kamal leads..."</ref>	+	Anwar Kamal is a politician in the Pakistam Muslim League (N) and is described as the leader of the Marwat tribe.<ref>"[http://www.financialexpress.com/news/story/188527/ Honour among them]." ''The Financial Express''. 2 Jan. 2007. Accessed 4 Aug. 2010. "The jirga had been convened to settle a blood-money claim against the Marwat tribe, which Mr Kamal leads..."</ref><ref>Honour among them; Pushtunwali." ''The Economist''. 23 Dec. 2006.</ref>

	===Bhittani===		===Bhittani===

Nangarhar Province

2010-09-03T19:21:45Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 19:21, 3 September 2010
Line 23:		Line 23:

	=====Insurgent Violence=====		=====Insurgent Violence=====
		+	While Taliban resistance in Nangarhar crumbled relatively quickly during the US intervention in Afghanistan in 2001, small-scale attacks on Afghan and coalition forces resumed shortly after Taliban forces were ejected from the capital city of [[Jalalabad District\|Jalalabad]] and American and Afghan forces attacked the mountain stronghold of Tora Bora in the mountainous southern portion of the province. In late December unknown attackers launched a rocket attack on a military base in southern Jalalabad.<ref group="ref">"Confusion Reigns over who Launched Missile Strike on Afghan City." ''Afghan Islamic Press'', December 28, 2001.</ref> Days later, gunmen ambushed a US unit on the Jalalabad-Kabul road, injuring a US soldier. The attack occurred in a similar area to where four international journalists were killed by gunmen in November.<ref group="ref">"Shootings: Journalists believed Dead after Ambush: Four Seized from Cars in Hold-Up.</ref><ref group="ref">"US Soldier Hurt as Military Vehicle Attacked in Afghanistan." ''Afghan Islamic Press'', 1 January, 2001.</ref>

		+	'''*2002''': Suspected insurgent attacks in Nangarhar died down during the winter months, the onset of spring witnessed a spate of new bombings and attacks in the Province. In early April, the Afghan defense minister, [[Mohammad Qasim Fahim]] was the target of a bomb attack in central Jalalabad; the minister escaped unharmed, but the bomb killed at least four civilians and injured around 18. Fahim, one of the leading members of the [[Panjshiri]]-dominated transitional government, had many enemies, so it was unknown whether or not the attack was the fault of remnant Taliban forces.<ref group="ref">"Bombers in Attack on Afghan Minister." ''The Daily Telegraph'', 9 April, 2002.</ref> Several weeks later, another bomb was discovered and disarmed at the Jalalabad courthouse.<ref group="ref">"Afghan Officers Discover Bomb in Court House in Eastern Afghanistan." ''Afghan Islamic Press'', 30 April, 2002.</ref> In early May, the Jalalabad airport, which was used to ferry coalition forces and military supplies into the Province was attacked with up to four rockets, in the first such attack on Jalalabad since the previous December.<ref group="ref">"Airport Used by US, UK Forces in Eastern Afghanistan under rocket Attack." ''Afghan Islamic Press'', 9 May, 2002.</ref> In response to rising insecurity in the province and the suspected involvement of Taliban and foreign fighters, US forces launched an offensive against suspected insurgent hideouts on the Nangarhar border with Pakistan in early June.<ref group="ref">"US Forces Launch New Operation in Eastern Afghan Province." ''Afghan Islamic Press'', 2 June, 2002.</ref> In early July, in one of the most severe attacks on the Afghan Transitional government, gunmen opened fire on the vehicle of Haji Abdul Qadir, a powerful Nangarhar politician who was serving as a vice President in the Transitional Government and Minister of Public Works, while he approached his offices in [[Kabul Province\|Kabul]] killing the minister. In response security was ramped up in Nangarhar due to fears of increased violence in the aftermath of the assassination. Although the government immediately blamed the attack on Taliban and Al Qaeda operatives, others suggested that the minister's personal enemies among other political factions and criminal groups could be behind the attack.<ref group="ref">"Tight Security in Eastern Afghan Province after Assassination of its Governor." ''Afghan Islamic Press'', 2 July, 2002.</ref><ref group="ref">"Afghan Spokesman Says Miniter's Murder was 'Terrorist Act'." ''Xinhua News'', 7 July, 2002.</ref><ref group="ref">Filkins, Dexter. "Afghan Killing May be Linked to Drug Trade." ''The New York Times'', 8 July, 2002.</ref> In August, a massive explosion at a construction office in Jalalabad rocked the city, and killed between 11 and 25 people. There was some confusion as to the cause of the explosion, with some officials declaring that it was a Taliban attack aimed at the neighboring Doronta hydroelectric dam, while others suggested that it was an accidental explosion of materials stored in the constriction facility.<ref group="ref">"Blast Kills 25: Afghan Military Calls it Terrorism." ''The Gazette'', 10 August, 2002.</ref> Later in the month another rocket attack targeted the Jalalabad airport and the dam.<ref group="ref">"Eastern Afghan Airport comes under Rocket Attack." ''Afghan Islamic Press'', 28 August, 2002.</ref> Small-scale attacks continued throughout the fall, underlying the continued strength of the remaining Taliban in the Province.
		+
		+	'''*2003''': In February 2003 a US patrol was ambushed in Nangarhar, resulting in extended clashes between US and Afghan forces and suspected militants.<ref group="ref">"US Soldiers Come Under Attack in Eastern and Central Afghanistan." ''Hindokosh News Agency'', 24 February, 2003.</ref>
	==References==		==References==
	<references group="ref"/>		<references group="ref"/>

Utmanzai

2010-09-03T19:18:55Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 19:18, 3 September 2010
Line 23:		Line 23:
	===Mehsud feud===		===Mehsud feud===
	===Militant connections===		===Militant connections===
-	The Utmanzai are closely connected with various militant organizations in North Waziristan. Perhaps the most well known Utmanzai today is [[Hafiz Gul Bahadur]], a member of the [[~~Mada~~ Khel]] and a descendant of the famous Faqir of Ipi. He commands some 1,500 militants, the most important militant group in North Waziristan along with the [[Haqqani network]]. Bahadur has tended to act the pragmatist, and as a consequence, his relationships with other militant groups and the Pakistani government have been reliably flexible:<ref name=Gopal>Gopal, Anand; Mahsud, Mansur Khan; Fishman, Brian. ''[http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/northwaziristan.pdf The Battle For Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict in North Waziristan]''. New America Foundation, April 2010. Accessed 20 July 2010.</ref>	+	The Utmanzai are closely connected with various militant organizations in North Waziristan. Perhaps the most well known Utmanzai today is [[Hafiz Gul Bahadur]], a member of the [[Madda Khel]] and a descendant of the famous Faqir of Ipi. He commands some 1,500 militants, the most important militant group in North Waziristan along with the [[Haqqani network]]. Bahadur has tended to act the pragmatist, and as a consequence, his relationships with other militant groups and the Pakistani government have been reliably flexible:<ref name=Gopal>Gopal, Anand; Mahsud, Mansur Khan; Fishman, Brian. ''[http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/northwaziristan.pdf The Battle For Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict in North Waziristan]''. New America Foundation, April 2010. Accessed 20 July 2010.</ref>
	<blockquote>Although he led North Waziristan fighters against Pakistani security forces in 2006 and 2008, he also signed two peace agreements with the Pakistani government, then proceeded not to fully implement either. Bahadur has moved in and out of coalitions with other Pakistani Taliban elements, but has always aimed to maintain productive relationships with them.</blockquote>		<blockquote>Although he led North Waziristan fighters against Pakistani security forces in 2006 and 2008, he also signed two peace agreements with the Pakistani government, then proceeded not to fully implement either. Bahadur has moved in and out of coalitions with other Pakistani Taliban elements, but has always aimed to maintain productive relationships with them.</blockquote>

	==References==		==References==
	<references/>		<references/>

Mezi

2010-09-03T19:11:29Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 19:11, 3 September 2010
Line 8:		Line 8:
	\|politicallysupports=Haqqani network		\|politicallysupports=Haqqani network
	}}		}}
-	The '''Mezi''' are a clan of the [[Zadran]] (Jadran), a [[Karlanri]] [[Pashtun]] tribe. The famous mujahideen commander [[Jalaluddin Haqqani]] is a Mezi Zadran, and much of the leadership in his [[Haqqani network]] are from the Mezi or allied clans.<ref>Gopal, Anand; Mahsud, Mansur Khan; Fishman, Brian. ''[http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/northwaziristan.pdf The Battle For Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict in North Waziristan]''. New America Foundation, April 2010. Accessed 20 July 2010. 6.</ref> A RAND report described the Mezi as "one of the Haqqani network's strongest support bases".<ref>Jones, Seth G. and Fair, C. Christine. ''[http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG982.pdf Counterinsurgency in Pakistan]''. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2010. 27. Accessed 27 July 2010.</ref>	+	The '''Mezi''' or '''Mizai''' are a clan of the [[Zadran]] (Jadran), a [[Karlanri]] [[Pashtun]] tribe. The famous mujahideen commander [[Jalaluddin Haqqani]] is a Mezi Zadran, and much of the leadership in his [[Haqqani network]] are from the Mezi or allied clans.<ref>Gopal, Anand; Mahsud, Mansur Khan; Fishman, Brian. ''[http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/northwaziristan.pdf The Battle For Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict in North Waziristan]''. New America Foundation, April 2010. Accessed 20 July 2010. 6.</ref> A RAND report described the Mezi as "one of the Haqqani network's strongest support bases".<ref>Jones, Seth G. and Fair, C. Christine. ''[http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG982.pdf Counterinsurgency in Pakistan]''. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2010. 27. Accessed 27 July 2010.</ref> Haqqani's Zadran rival, Pacha Khan Zadran, is a member of the [[Supeer]] clan.<ref>McGeough. "[http://www.smh.com.au/world/the-road-to-perdition-20090925-g6bh.html The road to perdition]." ''The Sydney Morning Herald''. 26 Sept. 2009. Accessed 3 Sept. 2010.</ref>

	==References==		==References==
	<references/>		<references/>

Zadran

2010-09-03T19:07:55Z

more common spelling

← Older revision		Revision as of 19:07, 3 September 2010
(3 intermediate revisions not shown)
Line 15:		Line 15:
	The Zadran are primarily located at the intersection of three provinces in eastern Afghanistan near the border with Pakistan: [[Gayan District]] in [[Paktika Province]], [[Zadran Disrict]] in [[Paktia Province]], and [[Spera District]] in [[Khost Province]].<ref name=CTC>Mili, Hayder. Townsend, Jacob. "[http://www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel-Vol2Iss8.pdf Tribal Dynamics of the Afghanistan and Pakistan Insurgencies]." ''CTC Sentinel'' 2.8 (August 2009): 7-10.</ref> This places them between a number of other Pashtun tribes, notably the [[Mangal]] (see [[Zadran#Mangal_feud\|feud]]) to their north and east, the [[Tani]] and the [[Daur]] to their east, the [[Wazir]]s to their east and south, the [[Kharoti]]es to their south and west, and finally the [[Ghilzai]] to their west and north.<ref name=NPS>[http://www.nps.edu/programs/ccs/Docs/Pakistan/Tribes/Jadran.pdf TRIBE: JADRAN]." Program for Culture and Conflict Studies at the Naval Postgraduate School. Accessed 12 July 2010.</ref>		The Zadran are primarily located at the intersection of three provinces in eastern Afghanistan near the border with Pakistan: [[Gayan District]] in [[Paktika Province]], [[Zadran Disrict]] in [[Paktia Province]], and [[Spera District]] in [[Khost Province]].<ref name=CTC>Mili, Hayder. Townsend, Jacob. "[http://www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel-Vol2Iss8.pdf Tribal Dynamics of the Afghanistan and Pakistan Insurgencies]." ''CTC Sentinel'' 2.8 (August 2009): 7-10.</ref> This places them between a number of other Pashtun tribes, notably the [[Mangal]] (see [[Zadran#Mangal_feud\|feud]]) to their north and east, the [[Tani]] and the [[Daur]] to their east, the [[Wazir]]s to their east and south, the [[Kharoti]]es to their south and west, and finally the [[Ghilzai]] to their west and north.<ref name=NPS>[http://www.nps.edu/programs/ccs/Docs/Pakistan/Tribes/Jadran.pdf TRIBE: JADRAN]." Program for Culture and Conflict Studies at the Naval Postgraduate School. Accessed 12 July 2010.</ref>

-	==Culture==	+	==Culture and Society==
-	While known for their reputation as fighters, the most Zadran live relatively simply, dependent on husbandry for the production of wool and cheese, and engaging in some agriculture. The Zadran are often clustered in small villages, going to the population center Gardez in Pakita to obtain goods like cloth and corn.<ref>Clements, Frank. ''Conflict in Afghanistan: a historical encyclopedia''. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, Inc., 2003. 133.</ref> They are divided into numerous tribal subsections (see right), though Bellew admits that his own list likely includes name variations of the same subgroups.<ref>Bellew, Henry Walter. ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=fAkEAAAAMAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_slider_thumb#v=onepage&q&f=false An Inquiry into the Ethnography of Afghanistan].'' Woking: The Oriental University Institute, 1891. 101. Accessed 12 July 2010.</ref>	+	While known for their reputation as fighters, the most Zadran live relatively simply, dependent on husbandry for the production of wool and cheese, and engaging in some agriculture. The Zadran are often clustered in small villages, going to the population center Gardez in Pakita to obtain goods like cloth and corn.<ref>Clements, Frank. ''Conflict in Afghanistan: a historical encyclopedia''. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, Inc., 2003. 133.</ref> They are divided into numerous tribal subsections (see right), though Bellew admits that his own list likely includes name variations of the same subgroups.<ref>Bellew, Henry Walter. ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=fAkEAAAAMAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_slider_thumb#v=onepage&q&f=false An Inquiry into the Ethnography of Afghanistan].'' Woking: The Oriental University Institute, 1891. 101. Accessed 12 July 2010.</ref> A Soviet report from Afghanistan in 1988 pegged their population between 120,000 and 150,000.<ref>Leshchinskiy, Mikhail. "SYMBOLISM OF GARDEZ-KHOST ROAD POSITION OF THE ZADRANS." ''International Panorama''. ''BBC Summary of World Broadcasts''. 16 Jan. 1988.</ref>
		+
		+	==Conflicts==
		+	==Mangal feud==
		+	Historically, the Zadran are blood enemies of the [[Mangal]], another Karlanri Pasthun tribe located roughly to the Zadran's north and east. After the agricultural season ends, both tribes depend on lumber for supplemental revenue, and have come to blows over access to such rights. This conflict continues to provoke violence, but has tended to be sporadic since the end of World War II.<ref name=NPS/><ref>"[http://www.nps.edu/Programs/CCS/Docs/Pakistan/Tribes/Mangal.pdf TRIBE: MANGAL]." Program for Culture and Conflict Studies at the Naval Postgraduate School. Accessed 12 July 2010.</ref>

-	~~==Politics, Conflicts, and Alliances==~~
	===Soviet-Afghan War===		===Soviet-Afghan War===
	The Zadran played a large role in the Soviet-Afghan war, first rebelling against the communist government in September 1979.<ref>Rasanayagam, Angelo. ''Afghanistan: A Modern History''. New York: I.B. Taurius & Co., 2005. 81.</ref> When Border Affairs Minister Faiz Mohammad went to Lake Tiga in September 1980 for a meeting with Zadran tribal leaders in order to buy their loyalty, they reportedly took the $28,000 he brought and promptly killed him.<ref>"Kabul Official Said Killed; 100 Relate Airline Exodus." ''The Washington Post''. 15 Sept. 1980.</ref>		The Zadran played a large role in the Soviet-Afghan war, first rebelling against the communist government in September 1979.<ref>Rasanayagam, Angelo. ''Afghanistan: A Modern History''. New York: I.B. Taurius & Co., 2005. 81.</ref> When Border Affairs Minister Faiz Mohammad went to Lake Tiga in September 1980 for a meeting with Zadran tribal leaders in order to buy their loyalty, they reportedly took the $28,000 he brought and promptly killed him.<ref>"Kabul Official Said Killed; 100 Relate Airline Exodus." ''The Washington Post''. 15 Sept. 1980.</ref>
Line 28:		Line 31:
	In late 1987, mujahideen under Jalaluddin Haqqani and local Zadran tribesmen blocked off the Gardez-Khost road and thereby succeeded in cutting Khost from the rest of the province,<ref>Wilder, Bryan. "Soviet, Afghan Forces Mass For Battle Of Besieged City." ''The Associated Press''. 15 Dec. 1987.</ref><ref>Shkirando, Aleksandr. "''PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT SITUATION'' IN PAKTIA PROVINCE." ''Moscow Home Service''. ''BBC Summary of World Broadcasts''. 16 Dec. 1987.</ref> though Haqqani forces had reportedly commanded the passes since 1980.<ref>Binyon, Michael. Mcewen, Andrew. "War of words as Afghans backtrack on Khost claim." ''The Times''. 29 Dec. 1987.</ref> A major Afghan-Soviet operation was launched in November, and after heavy fighting, the Soviets declared victory in January 1988.<ref>"NAJIBOLLAH ADDRESSES MEETING MARKING END OF KHOST SIEGE." ''Kabul Home Service''. ''BBC Summary of World Broadcasts''. 21 Jan. 1988.</ref>		In late 1987, mujahideen under Jalaluddin Haqqani and local Zadran tribesmen blocked off the Gardez-Khost road and thereby succeeded in cutting Khost from the rest of the province,<ref>Wilder, Bryan. "Soviet, Afghan Forces Mass For Battle Of Besieged City." ''The Associated Press''. 15 Dec. 1987.</ref><ref>Shkirando, Aleksandr. "''PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT SITUATION'' IN PAKTIA PROVINCE." ''Moscow Home Service''. ''BBC Summary of World Broadcasts''. 16 Dec. 1987.</ref> though Haqqani forces had reportedly commanded the passes since 1980.<ref>Binyon, Michael. Mcewen, Andrew. "War of words as Afghans backtrack on Khost claim." ''The Times''. 29 Dec. 1987.</ref> A major Afghan-Soviet operation was launched in November, and after heavy fighting, the Soviets declared victory in January 1988.<ref>"NAJIBOLLAH ADDRESSES MEETING MARKING END OF KHOST SIEGE." ''Kabul Home Service''. ''BBC Summary of World Broadcasts''. 21 Jan. 1988.</ref>

-	===~~Haqqani and Padash Khan~~===	+	===Post-2001 invasion===
-	~~One~~ of ~~Haqqani~~'~~s rivals has been~~ [[~~Padash~~ Khan Zadran]], a Zadran warlord from Khost who took an anti-Taliban stance during the American invasion ~~and~~ subsequently received the governorship of [[Paktia Province]] in December 2001. However, he soon found himself in several violent clashes with the government and locals, leading to a loss in American and central government support and his removal in February 2002. Khan attempted to overthrow his replacement, shelling Gardez and then attacking Khost in September 2002, only to be captured in Pakistan's border region in November 2003 and given to Afghan authorities in February 2004.<ref>"[http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3461351.stm Pakistan hands over Afghan rebel]." ''BBC News''. 5 Feb. 2004. Accessed 12 July 2010.</ref> Despite this, he was elected to the Wolesi Jirga (the lower house of parliament) in 2005.<ref>Siddique, Abubakar. "[http://www.rferl.org/content/Risks_Seen_In_Afghan_AntiTaliban_Tribal_Uprising_Plans/1947852.html Risks Seen In Afghan Anti-Taliban Tribal Uprising Plans]." ''Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty''. 3 Feb. 2010. Accessed 12 July 2010.</ref><ref>Giustozzi, Antonio. ''[http://www.www.crisisstates.com/download/others/SeminarAG29012003.pdf Respectable Warlords? The Politics of State-Building in Post-Taleban Afghanistan]''. Crisis States Programme, Development Research Center, London School of Economics, 2003. Accessed 12 July 2010.</ref>	+	After the 2001 American invasion of Afghanistan and the establishment of a provision government, Amanullah Dzadran of the Zadran tribe, part of the "Rome Group", was appointed as Minister of the Department of Border Affairs.<ref>Moore, Oliver. "New Afghan leader still fighting near Kandahar." ''Globe and Mail''. 5 Dec. 2001.</ref> His brother, [[Pacha Khan Zadran]], a Zadran warlord from Khost who took an anti-Taliban stance during the American invasion, subsequently received the governorship of [[Paktia Province]] in December 2001. However, he soon found himself in several violent clashes with the government and locals, leading to a loss in American and central government support and his removal in February 2002. Khan attempted to overthrow his replacement, shelling Gardez and then attacking Khost in September 2002, only to be captured in Pakistan's border region in November 2003 and given to Afghan authorities in February 2004.<ref>"[http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3461351.stm Pakistan hands over Afghan rebel]." ''BBC News''. 5 Feb. 2004. Accessed 12 July 2010.</ref> Despite this, he was elected to the Wolesi Jirga (the lower house of parliament) in 2005.<ref>Siddique, Abubakar. "[http://www.rferl.org/content/Risks_Seen_In_Afghan_AntiTaliban_Tribal_Uprising_Plans/1947852.html Risks Seen In Afghan Anti-Taliban Tribal Uprising Plans]." ''Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty''. 3 Feb. 2010. Accessed 12 July 2010.</ref><ref>Giustozzi, Antonio. ''[http://www.www.crisisstates.com/download/others/SeminarAG29012003.pdf Respectable Warlords? The Politics of State-Building in Post-Taleban Afghanistan]''. Crisis States Programme, Development Research Center, London School of Economics, 2003. Accessed 12 July 2010.</ref>

	This internal Zadran division between the Taliban and al-Qaeda aligned Haqqanis and the anti-Taliban Khan has tended in favor of the former, partly because of Khan's own marginalization since his rebellion against the government; however, at the local level, many tribal leaders are primarily concerned with their own people's well being over and above allegiance to one particular camp, possibly presenting an opening for future cooperation with the government and a divergence from the Haqqanis given the right circumstances.<ref name=CTC/>		This internal Zadran division between the Taliban and al-Qaeda aligned Haqqanis and the anti-Taliban Khan has tended in favor of the former, partly because of Khan's own marginalization since his rebellion against the government; however, at the local level, many tribal leaders are primarily concerned with their own people's well being over and above allegiance to one particular camp, possibly presenting an opening for future cooperation with the government and a divergence from the Haqqanis given the right circumstances.<ref name=CTC/>
-
-	~~===Mangal feud===~~
-	Historically, the Zadran are blood enemies of the [[Mangal]], another Karlanri Pasthun tribe located roughly to the Zadran's north and east. After the agricultural season ends, both tribes depend on lumber for supplemental revenue, and have come to blows over access to such rights. This conflict continues to provoke violence, but has tended to be sporadic since the end of World War II.<ref name=NPS/><ref>"[http://www.nps.edu/Programs/CCS/Docs/Pakistan/Tribes/Mangal.pdf TRIBE: MANGAL]." Program for Culture and Conflict Studies at the Naval Postgraduate School. Accessed 12 July 2010.</ref>

	==References==		==References==
	<references/>		<references/>

Nangarhar Province

2010-09-03T17:29:24Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 17:29, 3 September 2010
Line 19:		Line 19:
	Nangarhar has a majority [[Pashtun]] population, which accounts for around 90% of the population. There are minority [[Pashai]] and [[Tajik]] populations in the province as well. The Pashtun population comes mainly from the [[Ghilzai]], [[Shinwari]], and [[Mohmand]] tribal groups. [[Shinwari]] Pashtuns occupy a large portion of central Nangarhar from the Pakistan border north to [[Bihsud District\|Bihsud]],south west to [[Dih Bala District\|Dih Bala]], and south east to [[Muhmand Dara District\|Mumand Dara]] and [[Dur Baba District\|Dur Baba]] Districts. Within this territory are populations of [[Ali Sher Khel]], [[Manduzai]], and [[Sangu Khel]] sub-tribes. The [[Khugiani]], a [[Panjpai]] sub-tribe form a majority in the south-western Districts of: [[Sherzad District\|Sherzad]], [[Khogyani District\|Khogyani]] and [[Pachir Wa Agam District\|Pachir Wa Agam]] districts, as well as substantial populations in [[Hisarak District\|Hisarak]] and [[Chaparhar District\|Chaparhar]] Districts. In the northeastern portion of the province [[Mohmand]] Pashtun tribes predominate: the [[Buto Khel]] and [[Khoga Khel]] form a majority in [[Kama District]], while the [[Baezai]] have a larger territory, spreading from southern [[Kuz Kunar District\|Kuz Kunar]] to northern [[Lal Pur District\|Lal Pur]] Districts. The remainder of Lal Pur is dominated by the [[Khwaezai]] Mohmand. In the north west, on the border with [[Laghman Province\|Laghman]] and [[Kabul Province\|Kabul]] Provinces [[Sulaiman Khel]] Pashtuns reside, predominantly in northern [[Hisarak District\|Hisarak]], [[Sherzad District\|Sherzad]], and [[Surkh Rod District\|Surkh Rod]] Districts. Around [[Jalalabad District\|Jalalabad]] there is a diversity of ethnicities and tribes, which includes the province's minority [[Tajik]] population.<ref group="ref">[http://www.nps.edu/programs/ccs/Docs/PDF%20Maps/NewTribal/Nangarhar.pdf "Tribal Map: Nangarhar Province."] Naval Postgraduate School, Program for Culture and Conflict Studies.</ref><ref group="ref">Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry for Rural Rehabilitation and Development. [http://www.mrrd-nabdp.org/Provincial%20Profiles/Nangarhar%20PDP%20Provincial%20profile.pdf "Provincial Development Profile: Nangarhar,"] 2007: 1-2.</ref>		Nangarhar has a majority [[Pashtun]] population, which accounts for around 90% of the population. There are minority [[Pashai]] and [[Tajik]] populations in the province as well. The Pashtun population comes mainly from the [[Ghilzai]], [[Shinwari]], and [[Mohmand]] tribal groups. [[Shinwari]] Pashtuns occupy a large portion of central Nangarhar from the Pakistan border north to [[Bihsud District\|Bihsud]],south west to [[Dih Bala District\|Dih Bala]], and south east to [[Muhmand Dara District\|Mumand Dara]] and [[Dur Baba District\|Dur Baba]] Districts. Within this territory are populations of [[Ali Sher Khel]], [[Manduzai]], and [[Sangu Khel]] sub-tribes. The [[Khugiani]], a [[Panjpai]] sub-tribe form a majority in the south-western Districts of: [[Sherzad District\|Sherzad]], [[Khogyani District\|Khogyani]] and [[Pachir Wa Agam District\|Pachir Wa Agam]] districts, as well as substantial populations in [[Hisarak District\|Hisarak]] and [[Chaparhar District\|Chaparhar]] Districts. In the northeastern portion of the province [[Mohmand]] Pashtun tribes predominate: the [[Buto Khel]] and [[Khoga Khel]] form a majority in [[Kama District]], while the [[Baezai]] have a larger territory, spreading from southern [[Kuz Kunar District\|Kuz Kunar]] to northern [[Lal Pur District\|Lal Pur]] Districts. The remainder of Lal Pur is dominated by the [[Khwaezai]] Mohmand. In the north west, on the border with [[Laghman Province\|Laghman]] and [[Kabul Province\|Kabul]] Provinces [[Sulaiman Khel]] Pashtuns reside, predominantly in northern [[Hisarak District\|Hisarak]], [[Sherzad District\|Sherzad]], and [[Surkh Rod District\|Surkh Rod]] Districts. Around [[Jalalabad District\|Jalalabad]] there is a diversity of ethnicities and tribes, which includes the province's minority [[Tajik]] population.<ref group="ref">[http://www.nps.edu/programs/ccs/Docs/PDF%20Maps/NewTribal/Nangarhar.pdf "Tribal Map: Nangarhar Province."] Naval Postgraduate School, Program for Culture and Conflict Studies.</ref><ref group="ref">Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry for Rural Rehabilitation and Development. [http://www.mrrd-nabdp.org/Provincial%20Profiles/Nangarhar%20PDP%20Provincial%20profile.pdf "Provincial Development Profile: Nangarhar,"] 2007: 1-2.</ref>

		+	==Security==
		+	The security situation in Nangarhar Province is incredibly fraught. Insurgent groups maintain a strong presence across the province and regularly launch attacks against Afghan and NATO forces, Afghan government facilities, and local politicians and notables. Due to its proximity to Pakistan, Nangarhar is also a key area for infiltration of insurgent forces from Pakistan's tribal areas into eastern and southern Afghanistan. In addition to a strong insurgent presence the security situation in the province is also threatened by regular clashes between rival local commanders and criminal groups. Until very recently, Nangarhar was also one of the larger poppy-cultuvating areas in Afghanistan, which encouraged violent crime and strengthened the power of local commanders and strongmen, who also engaged in violent clashes with Afghan security forces.
		+
		+	=====Insurgent Violence=====

	==References==		==References==
	<references group="ref"/>		<references group="ref"/>

Zadran

2010-09-03T17:15:55Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 17:15, 3 September 2010
(4 intermediate revisions not shown)
Line 20:		Line 20:
	==Politics, Conflicts, and Alliances==		==Politics, Conflicts, and Alliances==
	===Soviet-Afghan War===		===Soviet-Afghan War===
-	The Zadran played a large role in the Soviet-Afghan war, first rebelling against the communist government in September 1979.<ref>Rasanayagam, Angelo. ''Afghanistan: A Modern History''. New York: I.B. Taurius & Co., 2005. 81.</ref> In 1980, Zadran leader Mohammed Omar Babrakzai played a key role in setting up a National Council, Loya Jirga, and then National Commission to unite Afghan efforts against the Soviets. However, the group's preference for a non-fundamentalist, federal Afghanistan after Soviet withdrawal provoked the Pakistani ISI to undermine the Commission in favor of its own protégés.<ref>Cordovez, Diego. Harrison, Selig S. ''Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995. 62-63.</ref> One of these was the famous mujahideen commander [[Jalaluddin Haqqani]], a Zadran from the [[Mezi]] clan, who now leads the Taliban-aligned [[Haqqani network]] with his son [[Sirajuddin Haqqani\|Sirajuddin]]. Zadran tribesmen also fought the Soviets with [[Yunus Khales]]'s Hizb-i Islami militant group, along with members of Khales' own [[Khuginani]] tribe.<ref>Adamec, Ludwig W. ''Historical Dictionary of Afghanistan, 2nd edition''. London: The Scarecrow Press, 1997. 150.</ref>	+	The Zadran played a large role in the Soviet-Afghan war, first rebelling against the communist government in September 1979.<ref>Rasanayagam, Angelo. ''Afghanistan: A Modern History''. New York: I.B. Taurius & Co., 2005. 81.</ref> When Border Affairs Minister Faiz Mohammad went to Lake Tiga in September 1980 for a meeting with Zadran tribal leaders in order to buy their loyalty, they reportedly took the $28,000 he brought and promptly killed him.<ref>"Kabul Official Said Killed; 100 Relate Airline Exodus." ''The Washington Post''. 15 Sept. 1980.</ref>
		+
		+	In 1980, Zadran leader Mohammed Omar Babrakzai played a key role in setting up a National Council, Loya Jirga, and then National Commission to unite Afghan efforts against the Soviets. However, the group's preference for a non-fundamentalist, federal Afghanistan after Soviet withdrawal provoked the Pakistani ISI to undermine the Commission in favor of its own protégés.<ref>Cordovez, Diego. Harrison, Selig S. ''Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995. 62-63.</ref> One of these was the famous mujahideen commander [[Jalaluddin Haqqani]], a Zadran from the [[Mezi]] clan, who now leads the Taliban-aligned [[Haqqani network]] with his son [[Sirajuddin Haqqani\|Sirajuddin]]. Zadran tribesmen also fought the Soviets with [[Yunus Khales]]'s Hizb-i Islami militant group, along with members of Khales' own [[Khuginani]] tribe.<ref>Adamec, Ludwig W. ''Historical Dictionary of Afghanistan, 2nd edition''. London: The Scarecrow Press, 1997. 150.</ref>
		+
		+	Of course, not all Zadran tribesmen fought against the communist government in Kabul. President Babrak Karmal is recorded as having met a group of Zadran elders on November 5, 1984, in which they reportedly promised to defend "the revolution and the homeland and to continue their fight against the counter-revolution and imperialism,"<ref>"Other Reports; Babrak Karmal meets elders of Zadran tribe." ''Kabul home service in Pashto''. ''BBC Summary of World Broadcasts''. 9 Nov. 1984.</ref> and the following year a man by the name of Khan Mohammad Khan Zadran was appointed as adviser to the Ministry of Nationalities and Tribal Affairs.<ref>"New Appointments to DRA Government." ''Kabul home service in Dari''. ''BBC Summary of World Broadcasts''. 31 Dec. 1985.</ref> A jirga of Zadran in Paktia in late 1986 publicly appealed to their fellow tribesmen to return to Afghanistan in peace; those that did not would have their property redistributed by the tribe.<ref>"Other Reports; Paktia jerga calls on tribesmen to return home." ''Bakhtar in English''. ''BBC Summary of World Broadcasts''. 5 Dec. 1986.</ref>
		+
		+	In late 1987, mujahideen under Jalaluddin Haqqani and local Zadran tribesmen blocked off the Gardez-Khost road and thereby succeeded in cutting Khost from the rest of the province,<ref>Wilder, Bryan. "Soviet, Afghan Forces Mass For Battle Of Besieged City." ''The Associated Press''. 15 Dec. 1987.</ref><ref>Shkirando, Aleksandr. "''PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT SITUATION'' IN PAKTIA PROVINCE." ''Moscow Home Service''. ''BBC Summary of World Broadcasts''. 16 Dec. 1987.</ref> though Haqqani forces had reportedly commanded the passes since 1980.<ref>Binyon, Michael. Mcewen, Andrew. "War of words as Afghans backtrack on Khost claim." ''The Times''. 29 Dec. 1987.</ref> A major Afghan-Soviet operation was launched in November, and after heavy fighting, the Soviets declared victory in January 1988.<ref>"NAJIBOLLAH ADDRESSES MEETING MARKING END OF KHOST SIEGE." ''Kabul Home Service''. ''BBC Summary of World Broadcasts''. 21 Jan. 1988.</ref>

	===Haqqani and Padash Khan===		===Haqqani and Padash Khan===

Madda Khel

2010-09-03T15:33:04Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 15:33, 3 September 2010
Line 9:		Line 9:
	}}		}}
	The '''Madda Khel''' are a subgroup of the [[Ibrahim Khel]], a branch of the [[Utmanzai]] [[Darwesh Khel Wazir]]s.<ref name=NPS>"[http://www.nps.edu/Programs/CCS/Docs/Pakistan/Tribes/Utmanzai.pdf TRIBE: UTMANZAI WAZIR]." Program for Culture and Conflict Studies at the Naval Postgraduate School. Accessed 23 July 2010.</ref> They are primarily found in [[North Waziristan Agency]], especially Kazah, Maizar, and Sheranni. In the early 20th century they were estimated to have 1,600 to 2,000 fighting men.<ref>Intelligence Branch, Division of the Chief of the Staff, Army Head Quarters, India. ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=DfkdAQAAIAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_atb#v=onepage&q&f=false Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India, Vol. II, North-West Frontier Tribes Between the Kabul and Gumal Rivers]''. Simla: Government Monotype Press, 1908. 335.</ref>		The '''Madda Khel''' are a subgroup of the [[Ibrahim Khel]], a branch of the [[Utmanzai]] [[Darwesh Khel Wazir]]s.<ref name=NPS>"[http://www.nps.edu/Programs/CCS/Docs/Pakistan/Tribes/Utmanzai.pdf TRIBE: UTMANZAI WAZIR]." Program for Culture and Conflict Studies at the Naval Postgraduate School. Accessed 23 July 2010.</ref> They are primarily found in [[North Waziristan Agency]], especially Kazah, Maizar, and Sheranni. In the early 20th century they were estimated to have 1,600 to 2,000 fighting men.<ref>Intelligence Branch, Division of the Chief of the Staff, Army Head Quarters, India. ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=DfkdAQAAIAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_atb#v=onepage&q&f=false Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India, Vol. II, North-West Frontier Tribes Between the Kabul and Gumal Rivers]''. Simla: Government Monotype Press, 1908. 335.</ref>
		+
		+	Perhaps the most well known member of the Madda Khel today is [[Hafiz Gul Bahadur]], a descendant of the famous Faqir of Ipi. He commands some 1,500 militants, the most important militant group in North Waziristan along with the [[Haqqani network]].<ref name=Gopal>Gopal, Anand; Mahsud, Mansur Khan; Fishman, Brian. ''[http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/northwaziristan.pdf The Battle For Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict in North Waziristan]''. New America Foundation, April 2010. Accessed 20 July 2010.</ref>

	==References==		==References==
	<references/>		<references/>

Mada Khel

2010-09-03T15:26:26Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 15:26, 3 September 2010
Line 8:		Line 8:
	\|location=Mahaban		\|location=Mahaban
	}}		}}
		+	:''For the Utmanzai subgroup, see [[Madda Khel]].''
	The '''Mada Khel''' are a subgroup of the [[Isazai (Yusufzai)\|Isazai]] branch of the [[Yusufzai]].<ref>"[http://www.nps.edu/programs/ccs/Docs/Pakistan/Tribes/Yusufzai.pdf TRIBE: YUSUFZAI]." Program for Culture and Conflict Studies at the Naval Postgraduate School. Accessed 10 Aug. 2010.</ref> They traditionally lived in several villages on the western side of the Indus River and a greater number of settlements farther west on the Mahaban mountain's northern side. This territory, described as "poor and barren", is south of the [[Hasanzai (Isazai)\|Hasanzai]] and east of the [[Amazai]].<ref>Intelligence Branch, Division of the Chief of the Staff, Army Head Quarters, India. ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=yvUdAQAAIAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_atb#v=onepage&q&f=false Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India, Vol. I, Tribes North of the Kabul River]''. Simla: Government Monotype Press, 1907. 194.</ref>		The '''Mada Khel''' are a subgroup of the [[Isazai (Yusufzai)\|Isazai]] branch of the [[Yusufzai]].<ref>"[http://www.nps.edu/programs/ccs/Docs/Pakistan/Tribes/Yusufzai.pdf TRIBE: YUSUFZAI]." Program for Culture and Conflict Studies at the Naval Postgraduate School. Accessed 10 Aug. 2010.</ref> They traditionally lived in several villages on the western side of the Indus River and a greater number of settlements farther west on the Mahaban mountain's northern side. This territory, described as "poor and barren", is south of the [[Hasanzai (Isazai)\|Hasanzai]] and east of the [[Amazai]].<ref>Intelligence Branch, Division of the Chief of the Staff, Army Head Quarters, India. ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=yvUdAQAAIAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_atb#v=onepage&q&f=false Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India, Vol. I, Tribes North of the Kabul River]''. Simla: Government Monotype Press, 1907. 194.</ref>

	==References==		==References==
	<references/>		<references/>

Dawari

2010-09-03T15:15:41Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 15:15, 3 September 2010
(2 intermediate revisions not shown)
Line 14:		Line 14:

	==Location==		==Location==
-	The Dawari reside primarily in the Upper and Lower sections of the Dawar Valley, created by the Tochi River in Pakistan's [[North Waziristan Agency]]. These sections of the valley are separated by a narrow, 3-mile long pass called the Taghrai Tangi. This pass and the entire area surrounding the Dawari are inhabited by the [[Darwesh Khel Wazir]]s, mostly from the [[Utmanzai]] branch.<ref>Wylly, Harold Carmichael. ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=69y1AAAAIAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_atb#v=onepage&q&f=false From the Black Mountain to Waziristan]''. London: MacMillan and Co., 1912. 429-431.</ref> ~~Because~~ of ~~conflicts~~ with the ~~Wazirs~~, ~~they often sought protection from~~ the ~~British~~.<ref>~~Intelligence Branch~~, ~~Division of the Chief of the Staff, Army Head Quarters, India~~. ''[http://~~books~~.~~google~~.com/~~books~~?id=~~DfkdAQAAIAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_atb#v=onepage&q&f=false Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India, Vol. II, North-West Frontier Tribes Between the Kabul and Gumal Rivers~~]''. ~~Simla: Government Monotype Press, 1908~~. ~~450~~.</ref>	+	The Dawari reside primarily in the Upper and Lower sections of the Dawar Valley, created by the Tochi River in Pakistan's [[North Waziristan Agency]]. These sections of the valley are separated by a narrow, 3-mile long pass called the Taghrai Tangi. This pass and the entire area surrounding the Dawari are inhabited by the [[Darwesh Khel Wazir]]s, mostly from the [[Utmanzai]] branch.<ref>Wylly, Harold Carmichael. ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=69y1AAAAIAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_atb#v=onepage&q&f=false From the Black Mountain to Waziristan]''. London: MacMillan and Co., 1912. 429-431.</ref> An article in 2010 stated that roughly 20% of the people in North Waziristan are Dawari, but that with the influx of militants in the region, the majority of them had left their "ancestral area".<ref>Khan, Raza. "[http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/jun/8/pakistan-taliban-leader-seeks-to-prevent-offensive/?page=3 Pakistan Taliban leader seeks to prevent offensive]." ''The Washington Times''. 8 June 2010. Accessed 3 Sept. 2010.</ref>

	==Culture and Society==		==Culture and Society==
Line 24:		Line 24:
	===Bannuchi===		===Bannuchi===
	The Dawari have traditionally been allied with the [[Bannuchi]] in the east, being brothers according to Pashtun genealogy.<ref>Wylly, 429.</ref> At the same time, the Dawari have historically had, as noted previously, a negative reputation amongst their fellow tribes: "An object of supreme contempt to his warlike neighbors, the Waziris, he [Dawari] is even looked upon as a bad character by a Bunnûchi."<ref name=Oliver/> These neighboring tribes reportedly believed the Dawari were the descendants of a Bannuchi father and Dum (''low caste'') mother.<ref name=Gazetteer/>		The Dawari have traditionally been allied with the [[Bannuchi]] in the east, being brothers according to Pashtun genealogy.<ref>Wylly, 429.</ref> At the same time, the Dawari have historically had, as noted previously, a negative reputation amongst their fellow tribes: "An object of supreme contempt to his warlike neighbors, the Waziris, he [Dawari] is even looked upon as a bad character by a Bunnûchi."<ref name=Oliver/> These neighboring tribes reportedly believed the Dawari were the descendants of a Bannuchi father and Dum (''low caste'') mother.<ref name=Gazetteer/>
		+
		+	===Utmanzai Wazirs===
		+	Because of conflicts with the Utmanzai Wazirs, they often sought protection from the British.<ref>Intelligence Branch, Division of the Chief of the Staff, Army Head Quarters, India. ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=DfkdAQAAIAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source=gbs_atb#v=onepage&q&f=false Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India, Vol. II, North-West Frontier Tribes Between the Kabul and Gumal Rivers]''. Simla: Government Monotype Press, 1908. 450.</ref> However, in the wake of the invasion of Afghanistan and the unprecedented introduction of Pakistani forces in FATA to fight growing militancy, the Wazirs were said to be "linking hands with their long-term rivals, the Dawar tribe, to protect their joint independence".<ref>Kemp, Danny. Jawad, Rana. "Pakistan's pro-Taliban tribes unite against army." ''Agence France Presse''. 27 April 2006.</ref>

	===Militants===		===Militants===
Line 37:		Line 40:
	In the aftermath of the Septmeber 11th attacks and the US invasion of Afghanistan, numerous Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters fled into the hills of Pakistan. Under American pressure to clamp down on the border, Pakistani authorities began negotiating with the tribes of the [[Federally Administered Tribal Areas]] to allow them access to these remote regions of the country. In early June 2002, the Dawari, along with the other main tribe of North Waziristan, the Utmanzai, convened a joint jirga, during which they agreed to allow Pakistani forces to enter the Shawal Valley, located in the far southwestern corner of the agency abutting [[Paktia Province]] in Afghanistan to the west and [[South Waziristan Agency]] to the south. At the same time, they decried as false the assertions by the Afghan Northern Alliance that fighters had fled into Pakistan, and warned that they could fight the United States just as they fought the Soviet Union if American forces entered the agency.<ref>"Pakistan: Tribal leaders not to allow US troops to enter North Waziristan." ''Nawa-i-Waqt''. ''BBC Sumary of World Broadcasts''. 7 June 2002.</ref> For its part, the Pakistani government promised 200 million rupees to develop Shawal.<ref>"GOVERNOR - ADDRESS TRIBAL JIRGA." ''The Pakistan Newswire''. 12 June 2002.</ref>		In the aftermath of the Septmeber 11th attacks and the US invasion of Afghanistan, numerous Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters fled into the hills of Pakistan. Under American pressure to clamp down on the border, Pakistani authorities began negotiating with the tribes of the [[Federally Administered Tribal Areas]] to allow them access to these remote regions of the country. In early June 2002, the Dawari, along with the other main tribe of North Waziristan, the Utmanzai, convened a joint jirga, during which they agreed to allow Pakistani forces to enter the Shawal Valley, located in the far southwestern corner of the agency abutting [[Paktia Province]] in Afghanistan to the west and [[South Waziristan Agency]] to the south. At the same time, they decried as false the assertions by the Afghan Northern Alliance that fighters had fled into Pakistan, and warned that they could fight the United States just as they fought the Soviet Union if American forces entered the agency.<ref>"Pakistan: Tribal leaders not to allow US troops to enter North Waziristan." ''Nawa-i-Waqt''. ''BBC Sumary of World Broadcasts''. 7 June 2002.</ref> For its part, the Pakistani government promised 200 million rupees to develop Shawal.<ref>"GOVERNOR - ADDRESS TRIBAL JIRGA." ''The Pakistan Newswire''. 12 June 2002.</ref>

-	Although international attention was focused on al-Qaeda, unrelated inter-tribal conflict was still a fact of life for the tribe. The [[Darpa Khel]] Dawari became embroiled in a violent clash with a Wazir subgroup reported as "Tabiy", which began on the evening of July 3 over a land dispute.<ref>"Eleven Afghan refugees killed in Pakistan tribal fighting." ''Afghan Islamic Press''. ''BBC Sumary of World Broadcasts''. 5 July 2002.</ref> By July 5 some 10 tribesmen were dead in addition to 11 Afghan refugees, who were at a mosque and house near Darga that was shelled during the fighting.<ref>"Tribal Dispute in Pakistan Kills 21." ''Associated Press Online''. 5 July 2002.</ref> The conflict was said to date back 35 years,<ref>"Two killed as fighting resumes between Pakistan tribes." ''Agence France Presse''. 8 July 2002.</ref> triggered this time, according to the Wazirs, by the Dawari occupation of a number of Wazir homes.<ref>"Intense tribal war kills 12 in Pakistan." ''Agence France Presse''. 5 July 2002.</ref> Finally, on July 12, Pakistani paramilitary forces intervened with artillery in an attempt to quell the outbreak of tribal violence.<ref>"Tribal war escalates in Pakistan, five more killed." ''Agence France Presse''. 12 July 2002.</ref>	+	Although international attention was focused on al-Qaeda, unrelated inter-tribal conflict was still a fact of life for the tribe. The [[Darpa Khel]] Dawari became embroiled in a violent clash with a Wazir subgroup reported as "Tabiy", which began on the evening of July 3, 2002 over a land dispute.<ref>"Eleven Afghan refugees killed in Pakistan tribal fighting." ''Afghan Islamic Press''. ''BBC Sumary of World Broadcasts''. 5 July 2002.</ref> By July 5 some 10 tribesmen were dead in addition to 11 Afghan refugees, who were at a mosque and house near Darga that was shelled during the fighting.<ref>"Tribal Dispute in Pakistan Kills 21." ''Associated Press Online''. 5 July 2002.</ref> The conflict was said to date back 35 years,<ref>"Two killed as fighting resumes between Pakistan tribes." ''Agence France Presse''. 8 July 2002.</ref> triggered this time, according to the Wazirs, by the Dawari occupation of a number of Wazir homes.<ref>"Intense tribal war kills 12 in Pakistan." ''Agence France Presse''. 5 July 2002.</ref> Finally, on July 12, Pakistani paramilitary forces intervened with artillery in an attempt to quell the outbreak of tribal violence.<ref>"Tribal war escalates in Pakistan, five more killed." ''Agence France Presse''. 12 July 2002.</ref>

	Dawari-Utmanzai relations again suffered a blow in May 2004, partly over the development packages put in place after the military's intervention in the area. Because the two tribes had populations of 12,000 (Dawari) and 18,000 (Utmanzai) during the time of the British administration of India, the two tribes were traditionally allotted things like development aid and jirga representation in a 1 to 1.5 ratio. The development packages for Shawal and Mara Khel were seen by the Dawari as upsetting this balance in the Utmanzai's favor, and moreover, they claimed that this preference was in part because the Utmanzai protected more "government interests" in the agency. As a result of this perceived unfairness, the Dawari tribal elders, including Malik Khanzeb, Malik Alhaj Muhammad Sher, Malik Muhammad Afzal, and Malik Habib Ullah, announced that the tribe would no longer hold joint jirgas in the agency.<ref>"2 WAZIRISTAN TRIBES SPLIT OVER SHARES IN UPLIFT PROJECTS." ''Frontier Star''. 30 May 2004.</ref>		Dawari-Utmanzai relations again suffered a blow in May 2004, partly over the development packages put in place after the military's intervention in the area. Because the two tribes had populations of 12,000 (Dawari) and 18,000 (Utmanzai) during the time of the British administration of India, the two tribes were traditionally allotted things like development aid and jirga representation in a 1 to 1.5 ratio. The development packages for Shawal and Mara Khel were seen by the Dawari as upsetting this balance in the Utmanzai's favor, and moreover, they claimed that this preference was in part because the Utmanzai protected more "government interests" in the agency. As a result of this perceived unfairness, the Dawari tribal elders, including Malik Khanzeb, Malik Alhaj Muhammad Sher, Malik Muhammad Afzal, and Malik Habib Ullah, announced that the tribe would no longer hold joint jirgas in the agency.<ref>"2 WAZIRISTAN TRIBES SPLIT OVER SHARES IN UPLIFT PROJECTS." ''Frontier Star''. 30 May 2004.</ref>